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The fixed charge for priority;
the floating charge for control.
--A saying of British bankers
This article is about the control of many billions of dollars of wealth that are
caught in bankruptcy like the spoils of a fallen fortress. It introduces a model based
on the concept of control that unifies at a theoretical level the twin pillars of financial
default, secured credit and bankruptcy. That model also provides a unifying
perspective on the academic literature of default. The model is based in substantial
part on the insights available from the study of secured credit and bankruptcy
systems around the world.
In the years 2000-2002, more than $760 billion of assets held by large public
companies came under bankruptcy administration in the United States; private
companies took billions more into bankruptcy.1 Those amounts represent great
wealth even in our immensely wealthy country. The redeployment or recapitalization
of the assets of these companies will result in large realignments of wealth, power,
and employment.2 Those same companies entered bankruptcy with many billions of
dollars in debt, which had also represented great wealth, much of which would
disappear. That disappearance would represent a series of financial calamities for
many people and institutions, calamities that would not fall evenly on every
shoulder. This distribution of wealth and allocation of calamity lies at the heart of the
process of recovery from financial debacle. Thus control of the recovery process
represents great economic and social power.
The purpose of the recovery process is to maximize the value of the assets of
the defaulting business and to distribute that value to designated beneficiaries.
Control of the debtor’s assets in the recovery process following a general default has
an important impact on both maximization and distribution. This article provides a
theoretical model whose core is the struggle between bankruptcy law and the law of
secured credit for control of the recovery process.3 The model can be introduced by
1

THE BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK AND ALMANAC 2003 at 38.
This article discusses only business bankruptcy cases involving corporations or other legal entities.
Consumer bankruptcy presents a very different, although equally fascinating, set of financial issues.
3
The present author made a start on this project three years ago. A Global Solution to Multinational
Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2304-07 (2000); http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=259960. [hereafter “Westbrook, Solution.”] In the secured credit literature, two scholars
identified key aspects of the control issue long before anyone else made it a central concern. See
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901 (1986) [hereafter
“Scott, Relational”]; Ronald J. Mann, Strategy And Force In The Liquidation Of Secured Debt, __
MICH. L. REV. 159 (1997) [hereafter “Mann, Strategy”]. Professor Mann’s findings in the United
States appear generally consistent with those of a recent United Kingdom study. Julian Franks & Oren
Sussman, The Cycle of Corporate Distress, Rescue, and Dissolution: A Study of Small and Medium
Size UK Companies (IFA Working Paper 306, 2000), http://forum.london.edu/lbsfacpubs.nsf/2
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the oversimplified statement that secured credit law and bankruptcy law represent the
struggle between a private and a public ordering of the recovery process. By placing
control at the center of the model, it reveals secured credit law as the necessary and
singular stronghold of the movement for the privatization of the recovery process
because a security interest provides the institutional mechanism for control of that
process. The model offered here would replace the outdated and superficial notion
that the struggle in bankruptcy is merely between creditors and owners.
The last decade has seen a furious debate over privatization of the recovery
process.4 The debate has centered on a group of academic proposals that may be
assembled under the rubric “contractualism.” Their proponents argue that the
recovery process should be governed by contracts between the debtor business and
its creditors, with bankruptcy law serving as a default option for those who do not
enter into bankruptcy contracts. However, these articles have proposed mechanisms
for establishing priorities in distribution without explaining just how the recovery
process would be managed or by whom.
Recently, some scholars have acknowledged for the first time that a central
issue in the debate is control of the debtor’s assets after default.5 Yet these recent
articles persist in failing to explain how control of the debtor’s assets would be
achieved, before or after default. In particular, none of these analyses identified any
connection between privatization of the recovery process and a creditor’s obtaining a
security interest. This article demonstrates that none of the contractualist proposals
can succeed without a security interest. Indeed, any such proposal requires the
creditor to obtain a dominant security interest, which is one that covers virtually all
the assets of the debtor. It then shows that widespread adoption of a privatized
system depending upon dominant security interests is as undesirable as it is unlikely.
Because the vast legal literature about secured credit and bankruptcy law has
largely ignored the struggle for control, the approach advanced here creates new
perspectives on a host of issues that dominate the current debates in that literature.
They include the role of control in the arguments about the economic efficiency of
secured credit,6 the proper analytical approach to distinguish “true-sale”
(httppublications)/2DA3FF18A16C59C080256A24003DF562 (site last visited 7-20-03) [hereafter
“Franks & Sussman”].
4
CR
5
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev.751 (2002)
[hereafter “Baird & Rasmussen, End”]. See also Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Control
Rights, Priority Rights, and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganization, 97 Va. L. Rev.
921 (2001) [hereafter “Baird & Rasmussen, Control Rights”]. See also David A. Skeel, Creditors’
Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, __Penn. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2003).
6
See generally, Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92
YALE L.J. 49 (1982) [hereinafter “Levmore, Monitors”]; James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for
Personal Property Security, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 473 (1984); Homer Kripke, Law and Economics:
Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 929,
941 (1985) [hereafter “Kripke”]; F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1393
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securitizations from security interests,7 and the uses and abuses of “bankruptcyremote vehicles.”8 It is the author’s larger project to apply the model to a number of
these areas. However, this article is introductory and limited to addressing the
functional disabilities of the contractualist project.
Part I of this article provides an overview of the theory and the model. The
law governing a debtor’s financial default has two central elements: priority rights
and control. While priority determines the order in which value will be distributed to
claimants, control concerns the management of the debtor’s assets during the
recovery process following default. The two laws that together govern the recovery
process—Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and Title 11 of the United
States Code (Bankruptcy)—incorporate rules about both priority and control, but the
conflict between them—and consequently the nexus that unites them at the
theoretical level—is control. Part I explains why the elaboration of more and better
methods of recovery have made control of the recovery process the principle
battleground between private and public governance of that process and therefore
between their respective strongholds, secured credit and bankruptcy.
Part II outlines a model of secured credit.9 The model establishes the roles of
priority and control in the law of secured credit. Although they are closely related,
they have distinct economic and legal functions. Because these distinctions have
been blurred in the vast literature about secured credit, this article must develop
some new terminology to describe the functioning of its model. The result is to
identify clearly the place of control in the secured credit model and to permit its
juxtaposition with the control function in bankruptcy law. Although this article is not
about the efficiency vel non of secured credit, the model does show the relevance of
the control function to the literature on that subject and thus connects the model to
the prior debates in the secured-credit field.
Part II distinguishes ordinary secured parties from dominant secured parties,
the latter being those with all-encompassing security interests. It explains why
(1986); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901 (1986);
Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 1067 (1989); James
W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy’s Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary
Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 27 (1991); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests,
Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 645 (1992); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt
Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. Legal Stud. 225 (1992); Richard L. Barnes, The
Efficiency Justification for Secured Transactions: Foxes with Soxes and Other Fanciful Stuff, 42 Kan.
L. Rev. 13 (1993); Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy- Priority Puzzle, 22
J. Legal Stud. 73 (1993); David Gray Carlson, On The Efficiency Of Secured Lending, __ Va. L. Rev.
2179, 2179-80 (1994) (hereafter “Carlson, Efficiency”); Mann, Secured Credit, supra note xx.
7
See, e.g., Jonathon C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization And Bankruptcy Reform: Dead Or
Dormant?, 11 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 101(2002); Edward Janger, Muddy Rules For Securitizations, 7
Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 301 (2002).
8
Cite needed.
9
CR secured credit discussion.
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priority is central to ordinary secured parties, while control is merely an additional
value, albeit an important one. By contrast, control has a much greater value for a
dominant secured party. Part II also explains how the nature and effect of control is
quite different, although equally important, prior to default and following default. A
further sharp distinction is drawn between control in the context of enforcement of a
single debt and control following a general default.
Part II goes on to introduce the interaction of the secured-credit model with
the bankruptcy model by identifying the elements of control as an additional value
for a dominant secured party, including the “bankruptcy veto.” Finally, it describes
the British model of secured-creditor management of a general default, an approach
that has dominated British commercial life for over a century as a standard substitute
for bankruptcy management. The British model has given dominant secured parties
both priority and control, but has been ignored in the American theoretical literature.
Part III introduces the bankruptcy model. It explains the role of control and
priority in bankruptcy and explains why control is the more basic concept. In
principle, bankruptcy law can accommodate any form of priority or no priority, but
control is its sine qua non. The discussion also questions the ancient chestnut that
“bankruptcy is equality,” drawing on comparative law to show that most bankruptcy
regimes may be viewed as existing for the very purpose of enforcing inequalities in
the form of priorities. One of the most prominent of those inequalities, found in most
bankruptcy laws around the world, is priority for secured creditors. On the other
hand, without control of substantially all of the assets of the debtor bankruptcy law
cannot perform its principal functions in the management of the recovery process. As
the British experience shows, the only serious rival to bankruptcy as a manager of
that process is the dominant secured party.
Part IVA describes “contractualism” and summarizes the various proposals
that fall within that rubric, including “automated bankruptcy,” “complete-system”
bankruptcy, and the waiver approach. Part IVB explains why contractualism is a
dysfunctional theory unless wed to a regime based on a dominant security interest.
The reason is that contractual bankruptcy creates a host of difficulties that cannot be
resolved except through linking those schemes to a dominant security interest. The
difficulties faced by contractualism are largely the same problems that arise from
giving a priority to a secured creditor and protecting that priority in a default.
Because these difficulties have been largely resolved by the secured-credit regime in
the United States and some other countries, the creation of a new body of law to
solve the same problems would be unnecessary and inefficient. Yet, if contractualism
must be linked to secured credit, it must be assessed as no more than an aspect of the
case for management of the recovery process by a secured creditor.
Part V explores two of the major theoretical difficulties with the securedcredit model of default control. The first difficulty is the problem of transactional
efficiency. The case for the efficiency of secured credit is unresolved, incomplete,
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and problematic, especially as concerns a dominant security interest. The second
difficulty is the “incentive problem,” a term that describes the secured creditor’s
disincentives to maximizing value for the benefit of other claimants.10
Part VI describes the evidence available from the debate in the British
literature over the effects of secured-creditor management. In Britain, the system
based on secured-creditor management has dominated commercial lending for over a
century, but has been under increasing attack in recent years for reasons similar to
the objections to secured-creditor control discussed in Part V. That critique has
recently resulted in a remarkable development: the abandonment of secured-creditor
management in favor of a system that steps significantly in the direction of Chapter
11 bankruptcy in the United States. Part VI argues that the British experience offers
substantial empirical support for the existence of serious difficulties in securedcreditor management of a general default. That conclusion is strongly supported by
the fact that the private receivership system is also being eroded or abandoned in
other Commonwealth countries, although it had been dominant in those countries for
most of the twentieth century. Canada is the leading example. Part VI concludes with
an outline of the empirical work that is needed to test the analysis offered here.
Part VII of this article summarizes the elements of the model and introduces
some of its implications. In particular, it does a preliminary analysis of the position
presented in the recent articles from Professors Baird and Rasmussen,11 using this
model to identify the strengths and weaknesses of their approach.
Because of the serious objections to contractualism and secured-creditor
control, Part VIII concludes that the system of public, judicial control of the recovery
process should continue to be the preferred alternative. It suggests that the
considerable movement in the direction of United States secured-credit law and
United States bankruptcy law in other countries, both developed and developing,
reflect the strength of the existing American system, although some of the reforms in
other countries may be worth serious consideration for adoption in the United States.
Part VIII suggests that further progress in the field will require theories that unify
secured credit and bankruptcy scholarship. It closes with the hope that more scholars
will drink at the well of comparative scholarship in the commercial field and
elsewhere.
As the foregoing discussion suggests, much of the argument in this paper
rests upon lessons drawn from the study of secured-credit and bankruptcy regimes in
other countries. Nearly every market economy in the world has such regimes,
10

There is a third problem, the policing of state secured-credit law, a job which history has left to
bankruptcy law. That point is related in turn to the problem of a “carve-out” to serve the interests of
stakeholders other than secured parties. Carve-out will be the subject of another paper. A carve-out
has recently been adopted in the United Kingdom. See Vanessa Finch, Re-Invigorating Corporate
Rescue, __ J. Bus. L. __ , text following n. 63 (forthcoming 11/03) [hereafter “Finch, Invigorating”].
11
See Baird & Rasmussen, End, supra note xx; Baird & Rasmussen, Control Rights, supra note xx.
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although they vary enormously. Study of these foreign laws rewards the student
richly with an appreciation of the underlying policies that shape these laws, their
relationship to national cultures, and the influence now exerted by globalization.
While commercial laws in the United States are among the best in the world, there
remains a great deal for Americans to learn from others.
Part I. Control
Understanding the reconceptualization of the theory of secured credit and
bankruptcy law around the concept of control requires some new perspectives and
new terminology concerning phenomena that are familiar and often discussed in both
fields. The result is a bit like looking at the famous ink blot and seeing faces instead
of the vase. It takes some retooling to achieve that result. For that reason, it may be
helpful to begin with a brief summary statement of the overall theory.
After a business enters general default,12 the traditional picture of the
recovery process comprises three conceptually simple steps: seizure of the debtor’s
assets, sale of the assets--generally piecemeal “on the courthouse steps”--and
distribution of the proceeds. The process of seizure and sale requires the taking and
exercise of control. The distribution of proceeds rests upon a system of priorities:
who stands where in the line in front of the distribution table. Thus recovery raises
issues of control and issues of priority. With this simple model in mind, the vast and
sophisticated literature of secured credit and bankruptcy law has focused almost
exclusively on questions of priority rather than the problem of control of the process
by which seizure, sale, and distribution are achieved.13 In the context of that model,
control of the process of sale is relatively simple and uncontroversial, while
questions of priority in distribution are at the center of most disputes.
The contemporary process of recovery is likely to be very different. Although
the redeployment of assets by piecemeal liquidation in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceeding is still frequent, in current practice the recovery process often means sale
of a business as a going-concern or financial restructuring of the business (reduction
of debt and extension of time for payment) in a reorganization. In the United States,
both of these methods of recovery are most often accomplished in a Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding.14 The resulting proceeds are often obtained over a period of
years and distributed in the form of equity in the debtor, new bonds, and various
other securities of considerable complexity depending in turn on the outcome of
complex sales and other restructuring transactions. In these circumstances, control of
the process of recovery has become at least as important as rules of priority. But for
12

“General default” means the debtor has defaulted on all or most of its obligations, by contrast with
failure to pay or perform a particular debt or other obligation.
13
CR.
14
They may also be done outside of bankruptcy, but even then the process of achieving an agreement
often turns on the outcomes projected in a Chapter 11 proceeding.
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the most part the theoretical literature has not reflected these developments and has
kept priority at center stage.
The reason that control of the process of recovery has become so important is
that the methods mentioned above often require more time and more complex
management, both operational and financial, than a simple piecemeal liquidation. At
the same time, the range of possible values, from a low value in a simple liquidation
to a high value obtained from a creative merger, has become much greater as well.
Closely related is the fact that key decisions in this more complex environment turn
importantly upon evaluation of risk and a willingness to accept risk. As explained
below,15 the consequence is that parties with varying priorities will have quite
different interests in the management of the recovery process and therefore strong
incentives to try to control it for their benefit.
Traditionally, the control of the recovery process rested in the trustee in
bankruptcy. However, outside of bankruptcy a secured creditor had its own unilateral
method of control and sale.16 Even when a bankruptcy proceeding began, a straight
forward liquidation might not justify pre-emption of secured creditor control by the
bankruptcy trustee, so the collateral might be “abandoned” to the secured party.17
However, as reorganization bankruptcy became more prominent in the United States-sooner and more extensively than anywhere else in the world--bankruptcy law
changed to impose bankruptcy control on secured creditors as well. The secured
creditor retained its priority rights as before, but control of the recovery process
extended to its collateral along with all the rest of the debtor’s assets. Secured
creditor autonomy, free of bankruptcy-law control, remains the norm in many
countries who still have piecemeal liquidation as the centerpiece of their recovery
paradigm, but the worldwide trend toward reorganization regimes in bankruptcy has
led in many countries, as it did in the United States, to depriving secured creditors of
their control of collateral in favor of bankruptcy control.18
Because United States bankruptcy law recognizes and enforces the priority of
secured credit with little deviation, there is no conflict and no particular theoretical
connection between secured credit and bankruptcy law as to priority. There is,
however, a profound conflict between them as to control of a debtor’s business. In
that very conflict lies the fundamental connection between them. The model of the
recovery process based on that struggle lies at the heart of the analysis presented
here.

15

CR.
CR.
17
Bankruptcy Code (“BC”) §554.
18
World Bank Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems
[hereafter “WB Principles”]; UNCITRAL Working Group VI (Security Interests), 2d sess., Dec. 1720, Draft legislative guide on Secured Transactions (2002).
16
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Part II. The Secured Credit Model
A. Priority and Control
Little of the literature concerning secured credit under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code has carefully distinguished its two central elements,
priority and control. Very many articles and books discuss the doctrine and policy of
Article 9 and its relationship to the Bankruptcy Code.19 A great deal has been written
about the transactional (ex ante) impact of secured credit on the efficiency of the
credit system.20 But the theoretical building blocks of secured credit and the
relationship between goals and methods within its structure have been largely
ignored. This article does not join the debate as to the efficiency of secured credit
and in any case a full discussion of that subject would be a large project for an entire
article. What follows is an outline of the priority and control elements in secured
credit sufficient to serve present purposes. The key requirement is to understand
control of the recovery process as a valuable element of a security interest distinct
from priority in distribution, a point virtually unexamined in the secured-credit
literature.
In this model, both priority and control are shown to be essential to secured
credit law outside of bankruptcy. As the later discussion of secured credit efficiency
theory will demonstrate, however, priority has been the centerpiece of that literature
and control largely ignored.21 Only two scholars in that long debate have fully
recognized the importance of some of the aspects of control discussed in this section.
Professor Scott almost twenty years ago presented a model of the relationship
between secured creditor and debtor that emphasized the benefits of one type of
control.22 More recently, in a series of articles Professor Mann has offered powerful
empirical and analytical arguments that control is a distinct, and distinctly valuable,
attribute of security outside of bankruptcy.23
As we will see, once bankruptcy is filed, it largely negates the control aspect
of secured credit, while leaving intact the priority function. That may be one of the
reasons scholars have failed to see the importance of secured-creditor control,
19

The classic work remains GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965)
[hereinafter GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS]. A search of the Westlaw “journals” data base uncovers
over 1000 articles discussing article 9 and bankruptcy from 1990-2003 (“ ‘Article 9’ w/p bankruptcy
and da(aft 1989)”).
20
CR.
21
See, e.g., the article that started it all, Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979) [hereafter “Jackson &
Kronman”]. CR efficiency text at Part V.
22
It was the type of control called “asset constraint” in this article. CR.
23
See, e.g., Mann, Strategy, supra note xx. His focus was also on the period prior to a general default,
although less exclusively.
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despite the important clue presented by Professor Scott and the evidence provided by
Professor Mann. Yet it is the tension over bankruptcy’s effect on the control aspect
of security that creates the theoretical link between the two bodies of law at the most
fundamental level.24
The first purpose of a secured-credit regime is a workable system to permit a
debtor to sell a post-default priority in certain collateral to a creditor, thus achieving
what are thought to be socially useful purposes.25 Priority for this purpose simply
means the right to be paid first, in full, from the proceeds of disposition of the
designated collateral. To achieve that goal, a secured-credit regime has three
requirements. The first is to assure the creditor priority in the proceeds of sale of the
collateral in case of a default, because certainty in that regard is crucial to generation
of its economic benefits.26 Yet priority in, say, yesterday’s newspapers would not be
satisfactory. So the second requirement is to maximize the value of the collateral. No
matter how great its value, however, the collateral will not serve the first goal unless
it is available following default, so the third requirement is to assure the availability
of the collateral at the time of default.
These three requirements must be viewed in the context of three dichotomies
of central importance in secured credit. The first divides the period prior to a default
from the period following default. The second is between an “ordinary” security
interest and a “dominant” security interest. The third dichotomy is between a single
default and a general default. These categories are important because the nature and
effect of the secured party’s control of the debtor’s assets is different on each side of
these paired categories.
1. Pre-Default/Post-Default
A secured party’s control of a debtor’s assets is crucial both before and after
a default, but the character and effect of that control change radically from the predefault to the post-default situation. Prior to default, the central function of secured
credit is to satisfy its third requirement, preserving the availability of the collateral in
case of a future default. There is no legal difficulty vis a vis the debtor. Article 9
swept away some ancient formalisms, so only a written agreement is required.27
However, promises by the debtor to preserve the collateral are of little value standing
alone. There is no point suing the debtor who ignores the promises and conveys the
assets to a buyer for value in good faith or gives a security interest to a new secured
24

It is instructive that the two lender-control articles recently published do not emphasize the role of
security. CR that discussion in Part VI.
25
Traditionally, the benefit was thought to be a reduction in borrowing costs and an increase in the
availability of credit, although the efficiency of secured credit in delivering these results from the
perspective of the credit system as a whole is hotly disputed. Part VA, infra.
26
Same CR.
27
UCC 9-203. The lender must give value, of course, and the debtor must have rights in the collateral
in which the interest is granted. See generally, GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS §10.2 (297-301).
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party. The debtor often has no assets left, so a judgment against it is only suitable for
framing. To preserve the collateral there must be a right to recover the property from
a transferee. That is, there must be a right traditionally called “in rem,” which means
that it is good as against third parties, even those acting in good faith and giving
value.28 It must also extend throughout the relevant market to be good against the
bankruptcy trustee.29 That result—ensuring the collateral remains with the debtor or
is readily recoverable from transferees--we may call “asset constraint.”
Article 9 has succeeded in creating a workable system of asset constraint by
the use of a highly effective system of notice. The giving of notice by one of the
methods prescribed under Article 9 is called “perfection,” and enables the secured
party to recover property from a transferee, subject only to certain carefully defined
exceptions. It is efficacious because the disclosure of the interest to the world
permits an inference of acceptance by subsequent commercial actors and therefore
justifies subjecting them to the debtor’s sale of priority and enforcement rights to the
secured creditor. Article 9 provides a remarkably simple, inexpensive, and readily
accessible system of notice by registration in a public office.30 That notice permits
the law to provide assurance of asset constraint to the secured party. This system
sounds easy, but took centuries to achieve.31 Indeed, many countries have yet to
achieve it.32 Any secured credit system is of little value if it cannot provide asset
constraint; that point is part of the larger truth that serious difficulties are inherent in
rules that permit a contract to bind third parties. Yet the system of specific notices,
combined with the general notice provided by the law itself, largely resolves both
problems.33
Asset constraint is a notably powerful and important function to have gone so
long without a name.34 Article 9 provides asset constraint by making unauthorized
28

Although a right good against all or most third parties is conventionally described as a property
right, the point is not undisputed. Lynn LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 Va. L. Rev.
1887, 1952-54, 1921-23 (1994) [hereafter “LoPucki, Unsecured Bargain”].
29
Westbrook, Solution, supra note xx, at 2283-84.
30
It also may have some serious imperfections, but that is a subject for another discussion.
31
The trick, of course, is to bind third parties without destroying free transferability in the
marketplace, without which inefficiencies will increase costs dramatically. Article 9 has largely
achieved that result, but the many important details are not the subject of this article. See generally,
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS, supra note xx.
32
World Bank Principles, supra note xx.
33
A system that derives its legitimacy from the autonomy values of private bargaining must create
unacceptable externalities if it affects the rights of third parties without their consent. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract 243 (1993). Notice is the device that
attempts to solve this difficulty--or at least ameliorate it--by a system that permits a claim that the
third party with notice has implicitly assented. But see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The
Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) [hereafter
“Uneasy”].
34
The closest term in the literature is “hostage value,” used by Professors Scott and Hill. Claire A.
Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient? 80 TEXAS L. REV. 1117, 1134 (2002) [hereafter “Hill, Efficient”];
Scott, Relational, supra note xx, at 927-28. See also, Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in
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transfers of collateral recoverable from the transferee, but that simple statement
belies the complexity of a system of constraint that has been carefully fine-tuned
over a century of experience to produce the right balance between protection of the
secured creditor and the maintenance of free transferability in the market place.35 It
ensures, to a very large extent, that the collateral will still be available if there is a
general default.
We will use the term “asset constraint” rather than “asset control,” when
referring to the period prior to default,36 because during that period, the debtor has
control of the assets. The security interest merely confers constraint on transfer to
third parties. After a debtor’s general default, a secured party acquires the right to
direct control of its collateral, because it may seize it, by self-help or by judicial
action, and proceed to realize upon the collateral with a broad discretion in the
method of sale or other realization.37 This valuable right to seize assets of the debtor
and control their disposition we will call “collateral control.”38 Outside of
bankruptcy, it leaves the secured party in complete control of the recovery process,
with only a broad and flexible legal duty to act in a “commercially reasonable”
way.39 This distinction between pre-default and post-default control is significant to
understanding the relationship between secured credit and contractualism, which
requires different kinds of control before and after a general default, while
bankruptcy as a system for managing the recovery process exercises control only
after default.
In the next section, we will address the fact that both asset constraint and
collateral control become qualitatively different in the hands of a dominant secured
party. Prior to default, constraint over all assets gives a dominant secured party a predefault check upon any substantial changes in the business activities of its debtor.40
The post-default collateral control given to a dominant secured party gives the

Financing Transactions, 87 Georgetown L.J. 2225, 2244 (1999). That term, however, refers to the
leverage arising from asset constraint, an important, but distinct topic discussed infra. CR
35
Obviously, overbroad restrictions on transfer—or, worse still, undisclosed restrictions—would
seriously hamper the functioning of a market. Among other things, overbroad restrictions would cause
potential buyers and other transferees to refuse trades or undervalue them because of the risk of losing
the asset to a secured party.
36
Professors Scott, Mann, and Hill have used the term “control” when referring to the legal protection
granted to a secured party prior to default. Scott, Relational, supra note xx, at 927-28; Hill, Efficient,
supra note xx, at 1134; Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86
Geo. L.J. 1, 25 at n. 93 (1997)[hereafter “Small Business”].
37
UCC Art. 9, Part 6.
38
CR to discussion.
39
UCC Art. 9, §§610(b), 627.
40
That extended form of asset constraint we may call “business plan constraint.” CR It is the sort of
control or quasi-control that Professor Scott had in mind in an important article about the possible
efficiencies of secured credit, although he did not establish the distinction as such. Scott, Relational,
supra note xx, at 927-28.
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secured creditor control of an entire enterprise and makes it possible for the creditor
to realize going-concern value.41
2. Ordinary Secured Party Versus a Dominant Secured Party: Enterprise
Control & Going Concern Value
The second dichotomy in secured finance is between an “ordinary” secured
party and a “dominant” secured party. In a basic and simple model of a secured
transaction, the ordinary secured party is one that receives a security interest in a
single item of collateral, while a dominant secured party receives a security interest
in all of the assets of its debtor.42 Their priority rights are the same, but their rights to
constrain and control produce importantly different effects.43
Suppose a debtor, General Kompute,44 that might give a security interest in a
large welding machine to a ordinary secured party or a security interest in all of its
assets to a dominant secured party. In case of default, the ordinary secured party
would have the right to take control of the single welding machine.45 The dominant
41

We will call the dominant secured party’s all-embracing collateral control “enterprise control,”
because it gives effective control of the business. CR.
42
There are many intermediate positions where the secured party has a substantial, but less than
complete, security interest, but that is another issue that must await a fuller development of the
secured credit model. It is obvious, however, that a security interest in the most valuable and
operationally crucial of the debtor’s assets might well amount to a dominant security interest. An
example would be a typical single-asset real estate case, where the holder of a mortgage on an
apartment complex may not have a security interest in the office furniture, the bank account,
maintenance equipment, and so forth, but its collateral nonetheless represents so much of the total
wealth of the debtor that the effect is much the same. An example that may be especially relevant to
the recent “control” articles would be control of the debtor’s bank account by way of setoff and cash
collateral orders. CR Part V discussion of Baird and Rasmussen articles.
43
Professor Scott is one of those who saw the importance of distinguishing among security interests
with varying scope. See Scott, Relational, supra note xx. But he did not seize upon the heuristic value,
as he might have put it, of the dichotomy between the secured party with an interest in a single asset
and one with a blanket lien nor did he focus on the enforcement rights of secured parties. (His work
may be subject to critical comment in this article to a greater extent than others, I fear, precisely
because he has published so many useful insights that overlap with the analysis offered here.) In any
event, his focus was on the quasi-control right he called “hostage value,” which this article would
characterize as an element of leverage for the secured party that arises from “asset constraint” or, in
the case of a dominant secured party, “business-plan constraint.” Asset constraint is the overall predefault effect of the article 9 rules, while hostage value is one of the benefits it generates for a secured
party. CR fn which mentions. Professor Hill has developed the hostage-value idea in more
sophisticated and useful detail. Hill, Efficient, supra note xx, at 1133-35. See also Mann, SmallBusiness, supra note xx, at 22-25, 27.
44
I trust there is no such company, but if there is one, it is not the company I have in mind.
45
The classic ordinary secured party is a vendor with a purchase money security interest in an item it
has sold to the debtor or is a lender who has financed such a sale. Such a creditor has no interest in
control of the debtor enterprise. Indeed, if there is a default, its interest will lie in quickly separating
its collateral from the rest and realizing as much as possible from its sale. Only in unusual
circumstances would it have an interest in the overall fate of the debtor enterprise.
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secured party would have the right to assume control of the entire enterprise, because
of its right to seize and sell all of its assets. While the dominant secured party might
not have technical control of the debtor company as such,46 it would effectively
control the entire business, from the office lease to the drill presses to the accounts
receivable and inventory. One highly important consequence is that it could sell the
business as a “going concern.”47
When the ordinary secured party sold its welding machine, it would probably
get only “liquidation value,” the value typically obtained at a liquidation sale. It is
established that liquidation value is routinely well below market value.48 Because of
the sophisticated procedures available to a secured creditor under Article 9,49 if the
ordinary secured party tried hard (for example, by advertising widely and waiting for
the right buyer) it might obtain a price closer to market value for that single asset, but
no more. By contrast, the dominant secured party’s control of all of the assets of the
enterprise would mean that it would have the opportunity to obtain “going concern”
value at an Article 9 sale, which may be much greater than market value (and
therefore much, much greater than liquidation value), because a living business--with
established customers, knowledgeable employees, and so forth--may well bring a
higher price as a unit than sale of each asset separately, even in the unlikely event
that those separate sales would obtain market value for each asset. It is generally
conceded that going-concern value is the highest possible value for assets and much
to be desired.50 The highly flexible Article 9 sale provisions make it legally possible
46

The right to sell assets, and conserve them in the meantime, is not the same as ownership of a
company, but does confer considerable control, absent bankruptcy
47
. Referring to the British system, Mokal cites as key this power, the ability of a dominant secured
party (“main creditor”) to keep the assets of the debtor together, contrasted with the inability of an
ordinary secured party (a “fixed” chargeholder). The reason is that it protects “synergies,” by which
he means something like what this article calls going-concern value. See Rizwaan J. Mokal, The
Floating Charge—An Elegy, in COMMERCIAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE at n. 30 (Oxford
Sarah Worthington ed. forthcoming 2003) (hereafter “Mokal, Elegy”).
48
See Matter of Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 312 (7th Cir. 1996). See Kathryn R. Heidt & Jeffrey R.
Waxman, Supreme Court’s Rash Decision Fails to Scratch the Valuation Itch, 53 Bus. Law. 1345,
1346 (1998).
49
UCC, Article 9, Part 6.
50
James S. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors’ Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the
Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973, 975
(1983) (stating that a central assumption of the reorganization sections of the Bankruptcy Code is that
a business will be worth more as going concern rather than liquidation value of its assets); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 776 (1988);
Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1252 (1981).
Actually, there may occasionally be higher values. For example, there may be an additional value for
a buyer-competitor in being able by an asset purchase to eliminate a competitor without successor
liability and some of the other risks of a corporate acquisition. Professors Baird and Rasmussen in a
recent article argue that few American companies have any going-concern value by the time of
bankruptcy, but do not deny that any such value is likely to be the best obtainable. Baird &
Rasmussen, End, supra note xx. They offer no empirical support for their claim about the availability
of going-concern value in fact.
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for the dominant secured party to make a going-concern sale.
As a consequence, if the ordinary secured party sells the welding machine at
auction after giving such notice as it thinks satisfies the Article 9 requirement,51 it
may get, say, $10,000 for it, versus a market price for such a used machine of, say,
$18,000.52 If it is willing to advertise extensively, make phone calls to other
companies who use such machines, and wait until the best offer is obtained, it might
get the full market value of $18,000. On the other hand, the dominant secured party
may be able to sell General Kompute (that is, all of its assets as a package) to CrossTown Kompute, which has been anxious for a second location for years and would
be delighted to retain the employees who know the eccentricities of each machine
and greet customers by name. The dominant secured party may obtain a full goingconcern value for the business, much more than the sum of the amounts it could get
by selling each asset.53 Thus the spread of values for the assets might be, say,
$100,000 total from a liquidation sale of each asset; $180,000 market value after
much time and effort in selling each asset; or $300,000 for sale as a going concern.
There is no guarantee that a going-concern sale can be made, but it is possible in a
substantial number of cases and increased payoffs like those in this example would
not be surprising. That going-concern sales by secured parties are quite plausible is
empirically demonstrated by the English experience described below.
Because the distinction between ordinary secured parties and dominant
secured parties has been so generally ignored in the literature,54 we need a term to
distinguish the effects of the two types of collateral control. The post-default
collateral control given to a dominant secured party we may call “enterprise control,”
because it gives the secured creditor control of an entire enterprise and makes it
51

UCC 9-611-14.
Unhappily, we have little empirical data on these points and must rely on the experience of people
in the field.
53
The statement in text must be qualified because in some cases (perhaps in many cases) the
managers or owners of a business may be crucial to obtaining going-concern value for the business.
For example, a manager may be careless about financial discipline, but may have a level of credibility
and technical respect among customers that makes him or her essential to the business. Because
personal services may not be legally commandeered in our society, even a dominant secured party
cannot realize going-concern value in such a business without obtaining the cooperation of key
personnel.
54
A recent well-documented article discusses the allocation of going-concern value between secured
and unsecured creditors and makes a number of useful points analytically, but puts no importance on
the distinction between ordinary and dominant secured parties. Omer Tene, Revisiting the Creditors’
Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus in Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations,
19 Bankr. Dev. J. 287 (2003). Professor Shupack identified the importance of the emergence of
blanket liens under Article 9, but did not develop the point. Shupack, Puzzle, supra note xx. Professor
Scott was almost unique in emphasizing the importance of the “blanket lien,” but focused almost
exclusively on pre-default control of the debtor’s business. CR discussion of Scott. Professor Hill has
usefully discussed the emerging notion in financial circles, especially in the United Kingdom and the
Commonwealth, of “whole-business securitization,” but that approach depends on the British
receivership system—that is, control by the dominant secured party. CR that discussion.
52
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possible for the creditor to realize going-concern value.55 The distinction between the
two types of secured parties is crucial because there is such a sharp difference
between the nature and value of an ordinary secured party’s mere collateral control
and the enterprise control exercised by a dominant secured party.
3. Single versus General Default
Following default, the law’s central goal is maximizing collateral value.
There is a key distinction here between a single default—only the secured party’s
debt is not being paid—and a general default in which the debtor is not paying its
debts generally. In the first situation, the secured credit regime is simply a highly
privileged mechanism for enforcing a particular debt, much superior to the slow and
uncertain business of getting a judgment and sending out the sheriff to seize such
property as can be discovered. Most systems around the world give a secured
creditor some advantage in debt enforcement, but the United States system is among
the most helpful to secured creditors.56 Part 6 of Article 9 permits the secured
creditor to use self-help, without the need to go to court. It may seize the collateral
and sell it under a very flexible regime of reasonableness, paying itself from the
proceeds.57 With or without self-help, the special enforcement right given to a
secured creditor in most legal systems, a right that we may call “collateral control,”
is a very valuable one, although its independent value has been largely ignored in the
literature. In jurisdictions like the United States that permit self-help repossession
and sale, collateral control is even more valuable.58
The shift from enforcement of a single debt to the general-default context
may radically change the rights of the secured creditor because bankruptcy negates
collateral control.59 As explained below in Part II, the reason is that control of the
debtor’s business lies at the heart of bankruptcy law and is its sine qua non.
Therefore, in principle bankruptcy must negate a secured party’s collateral control.60
The distinction between priority rights and collateral control is crucial for the
secured creditor in a debtor’s general default, because bankruptcy law honors one
and negates the other.
In a general default, a security interest is simply a privately bargained priority
55

Enterprise control is, of course, the cognate of the pre-default business constraint. CR
The receivership system is even more generous, but the North American system, found in the
United States under Article 9 and in Canada under the Personal Property Securities Acts, is the next
best for the secured creditor. For an expert discussion of the latter, see Jacob S. Ziegel & David L.
Denomme, THE ONTARIO PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY ACT (2d ed. 2000).
57
UCC 9-612. For certain collateral, like accounts receivable, it may simply collect the accounts from
the debtor’s customers without any court intervention. UCC 9-607.
58
The text refers to the value of control independent of priority alone.
59
B.C. §362(a).
60
This assertion is correct despite the fact that in a number of countries around the world secured
creditors are not restrained by the bankruptcy stay. See CR.
56
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in bankruptcy that was sold by a debtor to a creditor. The sale was part of a larger
transaction in which the priority was presumably exchanged for a lower interest rate
and better terms in connection with an extension of credit to the debtor. It is the only
privately bargained priority permitted under the United States Bankruptcy Code.61
Although our priority for a security interest is more absolute than that found in many
other countries, the security-interest priority is recognized to varying degrees in the
general-default laws of many jurisdictions.62 Most of the issues in secured credit law
in the United States, including perfection under Article 9 and adequate protection
under the Bankruptcy Code, relate primarily to the institutional apparatus necessary
to protect the priority of the holder of a security interest in the circumstance of a
general default. But its collateral control is generally lost.63
Thus the distinction between a single default and a general default is
important because of the difference in the secured party’s collateral control rights. In
enforcing a single debt outside of bankruptcy, the secured party has complete control
of the recovery process as to the assets constituting its collateral. If it is a dominant
secured party, it has control as to the entire enterprise. However, in a general default
the debtor and other creditors hold an option to remove the secured party’s control
by filing a bankruptcy proceeding, an option often exercised in the United States.
Once bankruptcy is filed, the secured party loses its collateral control.
In summary, priority represents the right to be first in line for payment from
the disposition of collateral after default. Control is the right to control the collateral
in some sense both before and after default. The importance of control is that it
protects priority.
Asset constraint is the secured party’s power to recover its collateral from a
transferee. In the hands of a dominant secured party, asset constraint amounts to
“business-plan constraint,” a negative power to prevent unapproved major changes in
61

That statement should perhaps be qualified, if one concedes that subordination is a sort of reverse
priority. Section 510(a) makes contractual subordination clauses enforceable in bankruptcy, so it may
be said to be a form of privately-bargained priority. On the other hand, such clauses do not constitute
a general subordination of a claim, but only subordination to certain other creditors, so they do not
constitute a priority in the full sense of the word.
62
World Bank Principles, supra note xx, P3 and accompanying text; UNCITRAL, Security, supra
note xx, Addendum at 5, 26. See also, Rolf Serick, Securities in Movables in German Law 108
(1990)(primarily by a retention of title theory for both suppliers and lenders); American Law Institute,
Transnational Insolvency Project, INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF MEXICAN INSOLVENCY LAW App.
E, III.D.2 (forthcoming 2003) [hereafter “ALI Mexican Statement”]
63
In a routine liquidation, the secured creditor may regain its collateral control. If the trustee in
bankruptcy is selling off assets piecemeal, it will often be efficient to release bankruptcy control of
collateral back to the secured party to permit that party to realize upon its sale. BC §554. On the other
hand, where rescue or sale of the business as a going concern is a possibility (for example, in a
Chapter 11 reorganization), the debtor in possession or trustee in bankruptcy is unlikely to relinquish
control. Whether the court will return control to the secured party under section 362 depends largely
on the court’s view of the prospects for reorganization and the required protection of the secured
party’s priority. CR.
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the debtor’s business. More direct control of the collateral arises after default.
Collateral control is the right outside of bankruptcy to seize the collateral and control
the recovery process, including sale or other disposition of the collateral. For a
dominant secured party, collateral control becomes enterprise control, because the
dominant secured party can sell the entire business and obtain going-concern value.
For both types of secured party, however, a general default may sharply reduce
collateral control because another party may exercise the bankruptcy option, which
would negate collateral control while preserving priority.
Asset constraint prior to bankruptcy is a valuable right that has received little
attention in the economic analysis of secured credit. Collateral control is a distinct
additional value that has also been largely ignored. Because bankruptcy operates
only after a general default, it is in that context that control becomes the center of
conflict between secured credit and bankruptcy law and thus constitutes the basic
nexus between them at a theoretical as well as an operational level.
B. Benefits of Enterprise Control to a Dominant Secured Party
The two most important benefits a dominant secured party gains from
enterprise control are the opportunity of realizing going-concern value after default
and a possible veto over a bankruptcy proceeding.
A dominant security interest offers debtor and creditor a substantial potential
payoff, absent bankruptcy. The ordinary secured party must lend based on its
estimate of the future value of its one item of collateral.64 If the item’s estimated
depreciating value at sale will at all times be in excess of the declining balance on
the loan, the creditor’s analysis is complete.65 It will determine the amount of its loan
and price it as a function of being fully secured up to the sale value.66 By contrast,
the dominant secured party is in a position to lend on the basis of being secured by
the going-concern value of the debtor’s enterprise, over which it will take full control
in case of default.67 That higher value may permit the lender to lend more money at a
64

The text is not inconsistent with the elementary proposition that all lenders are interested in the
debtor’s capacity to pay the loan without any need for enforcement. Shupack, Filing, at 790. The text
refers to the secured party’s analysis of its lending position qua secured party, that is, with sole
reference to the value of its collateral as part of its lending package.
65
Note that this estimate would be higher if there were no prospect of bankruptcy, because the
creditor could assume that in case of default it would be able to enjoy its collateral-control right to
manage the sale of the collateral. In reality, the possibility of bankruptcy means the estimate of value
by the ordinary secured party will depend in material part on the likelihood of bankruptcy and the
consequent loss of its collateral-control right.
66
That is, it will apply its secured-loan pricing and risk standards to the loan to the extent of the value
of the collateral. If it is willing to lend more, it will apply its unsecured price and risk standards to the
remainder above the projected collateral value.
67
The description in the text is shorthand. All lending is done on the basis of discounted probabilities-at least in theory. The actual value of a dominant secured party’s security will the going-concern
value discounted by the improbability of obtaining the going-concern value. More fully, where going-
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lower, secured rate of interest. That is, it may lead to an increase in capital
availability and a reduction in costs. That result is arguably desirable for debtor and
creditor as well as for society generally, other things being equal. Given the large
gap between going-concern value and other values, the enterprise control given to
the dominant secured party has the potential to be substantially more valuable to the
parties than the mere collateral control granted to the ordinary secured party. Its
institutional implications are also important, because the realization of going-concern
value is a principal justification for Chapter 11.68
As we have seen, however, bankruptcy negates collateral control. To that
extent, the value of enterprise control must be discounted69 by the risk of a
bankruptcy filing following default. Yet that risk may be reduced, and the value of
enterprise control enhanced, by a bankruptcy veto. A possible veto over the
maintenance of a bankruptcy proceeding is a second added value arising from
enterprise control. The bankruptcy veto arises from the fact that enterprise control
may prevent the funding of a bankruptcy proceeding and make the likely results of
bankruptcy unattractive to the debtor and other potential filers of a bankruptcy
petition, unless the secured creditor, for its own purposes, desires such a
proceeding.70 The ability to sidestep bankruptcy control and enjoy the benefits of
concern value is X, the piecemeal-sale market value of the assets is Y, and liquidation value of the
assets is Z, there will be a composite value equal to the discounted probability of obtaining X+ the
discounted probability of obtaining Y+ the discounted probability of obtaining Z. Assuming a fairly
good probability of obtaining going-concern value, the composite value will be higher than either Y
or Z, permitting the lender to lend more or to lend at a lower interest rate.
68
H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 (“The
premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the industry for
which they were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.”); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 776 (1988)
(recognizing “reorganization is […] especially valuable when (i) the company’s assets are worth
much more as a going concern than if sold piecemeal, and (ii) there are few or even no outside buyers
with both accurate information about the company and sufficient resources to acquire it.”); Robert C.
Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1252-54 (1981) (stating,
“[w]henever the going-concern value of an insolvent debtor’s business exceeds its piecemeal
liquidation value, and the receivership preserves that excess value, there is a net gain for creditors and
society.”).
69
Of course, the risk of bankruptcy also reduces the value of collateral control for an ordinary secured
party.
70
In a fair number of reported cases a secured party has agreed to a “carve-out” of value from its
collateral. See, e.g., In re Debbie Reynolds Hotel & Casino, Inc., 255 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.2001). See
also L. King, 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, 506.05[6], at 506-134 (15th ed. rev.2000). Because UCC
section 315 and BC section 552 give the secured party a broad right to the proceeds of its collateral, a
dominant secured party will ordinarily have a security interest in all the cash flow of the business,
leaving nothing to pay attorney and trustee fees and other expenses of the bankruptcy unless the
secured party agrees to use of its proceeds for that purpose. See, e.g., In re Hotel Syracuse, Inc., 275
B.R. 679 (Bankr. N.D. N.Y. 2002); In re Nuclear Imaging Systems, Inc., 270 B.R. 365 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 2001); In re Suntastic USA, Inc., 269 B.R. 846 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001). If the secured party
refuses, there may be no funds available to pay professionals and basic expenses, making a
bankruptcy filing pointless. The existence of the cases where carve-out was agreed necessarily implies
other cases--one would think a substantial majority of those involving a dominant secured party--in
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enterprise control over the recovery process may represent a substantial additional
value to the secured creditor, materially adding to the benefit associated with
potential sales at going-concern value.71 Neo-classical theory would suggest that this
increase in value would be shared between debtor and lender in the same way as the
other enhancements obtained by the secured party by virtue of a dominant security
interest.72 The benefit comes with certain difficulties discussed below.73
C. British System
Partly for historical reasons,74 this way of looking at the position of a
dominant secured party has been obscured in the United States. By contrast, it is the
classic and typical picture of secured lending in Britain. Britain provides an
empirical example of the consequences of a system in which a dominant security
interest is typical and a dominant secured party retains control even in a general
which the secured party would have no interest in a bankruptcy proceeding, would refuse a carve-out,
and would therefore leave the proceeding unfinanced and unsustainable. The rich literature and
caselaw on this subject references primarily section 506(c) of the BC, which gives a priority in
collateral proceeds to the reasonable costs of preserving and disposing of collateral in a bankruptcy
case, but only to the extent that the secured party is benefited. See, e.g., Steve H. Nickles, & Edward
S. Adams, Tracing Proceeds to Attorneys’ Pockets (and the Dilemma of Paying for Bankruptcy), 78
Minn. L. Rev. 1079 (1994) (discussing cases and suggesting reforms). Nickles and Adams criticize
the cases for having been unwilling to interpret this provision more broadly in favor of paying
bankruptcy costs. The cases most often are found under the heading “carve-out,” which refers to a
situation in which the secured creditor agrees that a certain amount of the proceeds of its collateral
may be used to pay attorney’s fees and other costs of a bankruptcy. This solution requires, of course,
the consent of the secured party. The arguments that Nickles and Adams, two knowledgeable
scholars, make in favor of requiring payment of bankruptcy costs from collateral are closely related to
those made infra for a bankruptcy trump of the bankruptcy veto. CR.
71
Of course, the bankruptcy veto would have substantial value even where the debtor does not have a
going-concern value because elimination of bankruptcy control would leave the dominant secured
party in complete control of the recovery process.
The benefits of control are not limited to the bankruptcy situation. See, e.g., Gau Shan Company,
Ltd. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992), in which the debtor tried to block a suit by
the creditor in Hong Kong. It’s key argument was that the creditor had an English-style floating
charge and therefore could block the debtor from access to the courts by exercising its rights, making
it impossible to respond properly to the Hong Kong suit. A similar result might be obtained in the
United States if a dominant secured party argues that its all-embracing security interest includes any
cause of action the debtor might have against the secured party.
72
Part VA, infra.
73
CR to incentive problem and veto problem.
74
A striking characteristic of Article 9 is that it makes “blanket” liens readily obtainable and
enforceable without establishing any different rules for the holders of such liens. The literature neither
suggests such differentiation nor explains why it is unnecessary. Few things are more obvious than the
dramatic difference in the positions of ordinary and dominant secured parties, but the difference is
ignored like the Purloined Letter. EDGAR ALLAN POE, The Purloined Letter, in THE PURLOINED POE,
Ch. 1 (John Muller, J. & William Richardson, eds., 1988). The reason is the failure to take account of
the centrality of the concept of control. Also contributing may have been the existence of many
middle cases, secured creditors with multiple security interests but not blanket liens, a point not
addressed in this article.
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default.75 Since the late Nineteenth Century, Britain has had a security system known
as the “floating charge.” The word “charge” means security interest. The scope of the
floating charge is roughly equivalent to a “blanket lien” in United States
terminology; that is, it is a security interest over all of the assets of the debtor. The
charge is called “floating” because it does not restrict the power of the debtor to deal
in its assets freely until there is a default. At the point of default, it is said to
“crystallize,” giving the secured creditor instant and virtually complete legal control
over all the debtor’s assets. Through a “debenture,” which serves some of the
functions of the American security agreement, the secured creditor has the right after
default to appoint a “receiver” with no intervention or supervision by a court. A legal
fiction makes the receiver, who is now called an “administrative receiver,”76 the
agent of the company, not the secured party, so the secured creditor is not liable for
the receiver’s acts.
The creditor-appointed receiver, who is invariably an accountant, then
proceeds to liquidate the debtor. In theory, the receiver should make every effort to
sell the business as a going concern and thus to realize going-concern value.77 If no
buyer is found for the business as a whole, the receiver proceeds to an asset
liquidation with broad powers to choose the methods of sale. As a matter of course
there is no court involvement—or supervision—of any kind. Often no bankruptcy
proceeding78 is filed at all. If there is a need to resolve issues beyond the sale of the
assets, then a voluntary or involuntary liquidation might follow the receivership.79
75

My British friends will find the following description painfully simplistic to the point of error, but I
eschew all nuance in an effort to be clear to a United States audience. For far fuller and better
discussions of the floating charge, See, e.g., REPORT OF THE INSOLVENCY LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE,
INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, [1981] CMND. 8558, 9 [hereafter the “Cork Report”]; Roy Goode
et al., Debtor-Creditor Regimes, in World Bank, Building Effective Insolvency Systems 1, 2-3 (1999);
Ian Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency 373-424 (3d Ed. 2002); Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency
Law 234-69 (2002); R.M. Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security at 46-51, 76-77 (2d ed.
1988) [hereafter “Goode, Security”].
76
Perhaps to keep foreigners confused, the private receiver, appointed out of court by the secured
party, is called an “administrative receiver,” while the court-appointed manager of an attempted
reorganization is called an “administrator.” (Now if we can only learn how to pronounce
“Leiscester.”)
77
Cork Report, supra note xx, at xx.
78
I will use the term bankruptcy per United States usage, although in Britain (and most of the
English-speaking world) the term for a corporate bankruptcy is an “insolvency proceeding.” The word
bankruptcy is used in Britain and elsewhere to mean the bankruptcy of a natural person. Am. L. Inst.,
Transnational Insolvency Project, PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION IN TRANSNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY CASES AMONG MEMBERS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT at 1 n.2 (2003) [hereinafter “ALI Statement”]. Although the analysis in this article is
limited to business debtors that are legal entities, I will use “bankruptcy” in the service of clarity for
an American audience.
79
Gabriel Moss, Comparative Bankruptcy Cultures: Rescue or Liquidation? Comparison of Tends in
National Law—Britain, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 115, 121 (noting, “In Britain, most rescues of
businesses have involved the sale of the business to other entities, while the insolvent rump of the
corporation has, generally speaking, gone into liquidation.”).
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An example would be the happy, if perhaps rare, instance in which there is a surplus
after the secured party is paid in full from the sale of the assets and there is need for a
bankruptcy proceeding to distribute the remaining proceeds according to the
statutory scheme.80
The creditor who holds the floating charge in this system almost always has a
“fixed” charge as well, often over most, if not all, of the debtor’s assets.81 It is the
fixed charge that provides priority in distribution, because the floating charge is
subordinate to a number of “preferences” (priorities), including tax claims.82 Thus
the British bankers’ saying that introduces this article: the fixed charge for priority,
the floating charge for control.83 For our purposes, the most important point is the
separation of the two functions of a security interest, one that is rarely so obvious in
United States practice and therefore often ignored.84
This sort of lending arrangement is typical in Britain, while the “blanket lien”
is only one of a number of lending patterns in the United States and not necessarily
the most frequent.85 In Britain, banks, especially the four dominant “clearing” banks,
employ the floating charge routinely,86 although apparently it is not so often found
where the debtor is a major company. Thus Britain presents a “natural experiment”
for observation of the effects of a lending system that depends primarily on dominant
security interests.
English accountants report that they are fairly frequently successful in selling
businesses intact and thus obtaining going-concern values.87 They do not quantify
these reports and one may wonder about how often going-concern values are actually
achieved. Nonetheless, there is no reason to doubt the honesty of their reports that
such sales are made. The English experience certainly demonstrates that such sales
can be achieved by dominant secured parties exercising a fully realized enterprise
80

As the quotation that leads this article suggests, the lender often takes “fixed charges,” on specific
assets. A fixed charge is similar to a security interest of the sort found in North America. It has several
advantages, including the fact that the charge is not subordinated to certain other priority creditors, as
a floating charge may be. See Goode, Security, supra note xx, at 52.
81
A “fixed” charge is more or less the same as a security interest in United States law.
82
Id. See Mokal, Elegy supra note xx.
83
The explanation for the combination of fixed and floating charges is complex and its detail would
take us too far out of our way. See generally, Goode, Security supra note xx; Mokal, Elegy, supra
note xx; Finch, supra note xx.
84
It must be said, however, that the distinction has often been ignored in the British literature as well.
See Mokal, Elegy, supra note xx.
85
See Paul M. Shupack, Preferred Capital Structures And The Question Of Filing, 79 Minn. L. Rev.
787 (1995) (some empirical data) [hereafter Shupack, Filing]. There are few empirical data to help us
on this point, but the statement in text would command considerable agreement in the field.
86
Cork report at 9. The United Kingdom Insolvency Service, “A Review of Company Rescue and
Business Reconstruction Mechanisms,” at 9 (1999) [hereafter “British Review”].
87
A recent study confirms that conclusion. Franks and Sussman, supra note xx; Cork Report, supra
note xx.
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control. Although the receiver system no doubt facilitates this process, there is no
reason in principle that dominant secured parties cannot achieve the same results
under the very flexible provisions of Article 9 and no reason to doubt that they have
done so.88
Part III. The Bankruptcy Model
Much less development is needed in describing a basic model of bankruptcy
for the purpose of establishing the centrality of control and its relationship to
priority, because there is a considerable consensus on some central points. It has long
been understood that bankruptcy is a collective proceeding to be used primarily, if
not exclusively,89 when a debtor has entered general default, and that bankruptcy’s
central purpose is the maximization of the value to be distributed to its designated
beneficiaries. It can be argued that other purposes are also important, or even central,
to the bankruptcy function,90 but the maximization of distributions to beneficiaries is
a consensus goal.91 On the other hand, we find a considerable debate about the
choice of beneficiaries. Especially in the business context—the only sorts of cases
considered in this article--some argue that only creditors should be regarded as
beneficiaries of the process,92 while others would find a place for employees,
entrepreneurs, and even communities.93 But each disputant would want to maximize
88

Cf. Bezanson v. Fleet Bank-Nh, 29 F.3d 16- (1st Cir. 1994) (Secured creditor got something like
going concern value, but for its own benefit, although the deal was ultimately unsuccessful). There
may be reason to wonder, however, if they have often done so at the point of the “official” Article 9
sale. Id. See CR re bidding in and re carve-out.
89
A bankruptcy filing by a debtor not in general default is likely to be dismissed. The courts have
made it clear that bankruptcy is not ordinarily to be used in single-creditor disputes rather than general
defaults. See, e.g., In re Better Care, Ltd., 97 B.R. 405, 419 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) Furthermore, a
filing by a debtor who is not in general default is unlikely because it will often lack the incentive to
risk control of its business to resolve a single-creditor dispute. Bankruptcy is a blunt instrument for
debt enforcement and legal systems should not rely on it for that purpose. WB Principles, supra note
xx, P2, §45.
90
Jay L. Westbrook, The Globalization of Bankruptcy Reform, 1999 N.Z. L.Rev. 401, 404-10. (seven
purposes for bankruptcy, beginning with social control).
91
See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7-19, 22-27 (1986)
[hereinafter JACKSON, LOGIC]; Max Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3-9
(1940) (explaining that since Henry VIII, the time of the earliest bankruptcy statute, there was always
some method by which all the creditors were compelled to accept their disposition of their claims
against the bankrupt’s property; this collective action to maximize value has always been the central
agreed function of bankruptcy); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American
Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 319-23 (1993); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution,
Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 822-24 (1987);
Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645, 647
(1992).
92
JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note xx.
93
The long-ago debate between Professors Warren and Baird remains fresh in this regard. Elizabeth
Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 777 (1987); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution,
Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815 (1987). See also,
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value for its favored beneficiaries.
After the identification of beneficiaries comes the establishment of priorities.
Every bankruptcy system establishes priorities in distribution.94 These priority
schemes vary greatly from one country to another. There is a pattern at the top,
because three groups are favored in most systems: employees, secured creditors, and
governments.95 Even as to those privileged creditors,96 however, the national
schemes vary greatly in their generosity to each group. For example, employees are
given only a modest priority in the United States,97 but have a dominant position in
Mexico per its constitution.98 By contrast, secured creditors have a nearly absolute
priority in their collateral in the United States, but are subordinated to other interests
in a number of countries.99

Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336 (1993)
[hereafter “Warren, Policymaking”].
94
WB Principles, supra note xx; UNCITRAL Guide, supra note xx. See generally Jay L. Westbrook,
Universal Participation in Transnational Bankruptcies, Making Commercial Law, Essays in Honour of
Roy Goode 419 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997); Jay L. Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 Tex. Int’l L.J.
27 (1998).
95
Id. See also 1 J. DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND § 1.06 (1986) (in many
countries there are general preferences in bankruptcy for secured creditors, employee claims, and
governments); Jacob S. Ziegel, Preferences and Priorities in Insolvency Law: Is There a Solution? 39
St. Louis L.J. 793, 796 (1995) (maintaining that many countries follow the U.S. practice of providing
priority to secured creditors in bankruptcy); Barbara K. Morgan, Should the Sovereign Be Paid First?
A Comparative International Analysis for the Priority of Tax Claims in Bankruptcy, 74 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 416 (2000) (internationally government claims are among the highest in bankruptcy priority).
96
The favorable distribution rights that are called “priorities” in the United States are often called in
English “privileges” in descriptions of civil-law systems. See, e.g., Mexican Statement, supra note xx,
at sec. IV.F(1)(c)-(d) (referring to singularly privileged creditors);”Ley de Concursos Mercantiles y de
Reforma al Artculo 88 de la Ley Organica del Poder Judicial de la Federacion”, D.O., May 22, 2000
(Mexican Bankruptcy Law); Draft Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, U.N. General Assembly
Working Group V, 28th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.63/Add.1(2003). They are also called
“preferences” in some systems.
97
11 U.S.C. §507(a)(3)-(4) (wages earned within 90 days of bankruptcy up to $4,000 per employee,
plus limited amounts of employee benefits).
98
ALI Mexican Statement, supra note xx, sec.IV.F(1).
99
Interestingly, the United States priority is nowhere explicitly stated in the Code. Germany is only
one of a number of countries to provide for surcharges on collateral, reducing the secured party’s
return from the collateral. See Kenneth N. Klee, Barbarians at the Trough: Riposte in Defense of the
Warren Carve-Out Proposal, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1466, 1477-78 (1997) (describing rule recently
adopted in Germany). Other countries subordinate secured parties to other creditors. See, e.g., Goode,
Security, supra note xx at 52 (United Kingdom); ALI Mexican Statement, supra note xx, sec. IV.F(1);
WB Principles, supra note xx. Interestingly, the United States priority is nowhere explicitly stated in
the Code. Germany is only one of a number of countries to provide for surcharges on collateral,
reducing the secured party’s return from the collateral. See Kenneth N. Klee, Barbarians at the
Trough: Riposte in Defense of the Warren Carve-Out Proposal, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1466, 147778 (1997) (describing rule recently adopted in Germany). Other countries subordinate secured parties
to other creditors. See, e.g., Goode, Security, supra note xx at 52 (United Kingdom); ALI Mexican
Statement, supra note xx, sec. IV.F(1); WB Principles, supra note xx.
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The only real constant as to priorities in bankruptcy regimes around the world
is the omnipresence of priorities, which is the same as saying there is a universal
absence of equality of distribution. Equality of distribution (in the common law
tradition, “equity is equality”) is often said to be a central tenet of bankruptcy law in
every country.100 However, the exceptions do not prove that rule, but swallow it.101 A
tenet that lacks a single observation cannot be taken seriously. It is true that
bankruptcy has as a major purpose equality of distribution to all those within a legal
“class” of creditors. That is, those with equal rights should receive equal treatment.
As a statement of priority, that point is trivial. Presumably, all law aims to treat
similarly situated persons similarly. But as a statement of control, it has content. To
understand its content, it is necessary to understand the role of control in the
collective process that is bankruptcy. In brief, control is necessary to enforce any
system of priority, including a system of equality (an absence of priority).
Every bankruptcy system includes a moratorium (stay) that can effectively
block creditor access to some or all of the debtor’s assets. The moratorium often
restrains lawsuits and other actions to collect debt as well.102 Along with the
moratorium, bankruptcy systems routinely give control of the debtor’s assets to the
designated controller of the bankruptcy process,103 although with great variation in
the legal doctrines that produce that result.104 On the basis of these two legal
100

JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note xx, at 29 (stating the principle is “perhaps the most common—and
uncontroversial—of bankruptcy’s policies.”); Charles Seligson, Preferences Under the Bankruptcy
Act, 15 VAND. L. REV. 115, 115 (1961) (stating, “[e]quity is equality. That maxim is a theme of
bankruptcy administration--one of the cornerstones of the bankruptcy structure.”); James W. Bowers,
Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy’s Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary
Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097, 2101-02 (1990); Warren, Policymaking, supra note
xx, at 353-61. But see Jay L. Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK.
J. INT. L. 499, 508-09 (1991) (only applies within a class, so not important except in the context of
non-discrimination against foreigners).
101
This point has recently become recognized in the British literature. See Rizwaan J. Mokal, Priority
as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth, 60 C.L.J. 581 (2001). See also Look Chan Ho, On Parri Passu,
Equality and Hotchpot in Cross-Border Insolvency, xxx.
102
In many countries, however, the stay is not automatic as it is in the United States. Instead, the
responsible court is given the power to issue orders restraining seizure of assets and other conduct.
See, e.g., Junichi Matsushita, The Summary of the Bill for the Law on Recognition and Assistance of a
Foreign Insolvency Proceeding, THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 31, at
334 (No.43, 2000); ALI Mexican Statement, supra note xx, sec.II.F(1).
103
For example, in the United States the controller is the trustee in bankruptcy or debtor-inpossession. 11 U.S.C. §1104. In several other countries, the controller is an administrator or the old
management subject to the supervision of a court-appointed official. See, e.g., ALI Mexican
Statement, supra note xx, at II.C., IV.B. (conciliador; sindico); ALI Canadian Statement, supra note
xx, at I.C.7., D. 1, E. 3. (trustee; monitor)
104
Some systems contemplate creation of an estate to which the debtor’s property is conveyed by the
law. See, e.g., American Law Institute, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT, International
Statement of Mexican Insolvency Law XX (2003 forthcoming) (“masa” or estate assumes all of the
debtors property). Other systems conceive that the debtor’s assets become the property of the trustee.
See e.g. Canadian Statement, supra note xx, I.C.e. Virtually all limit the debtor’s power to convey or
otherwise control those assets. WB Principles, supra note xx, Principle 11.
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preliminaries, the controller can marshal assets, manage an ongoing business, seek
bids for assets, bring avoiding actions, and, ultimately, distribute proceeds or
otherwise benefit the chosen beneficiaries of the process.
The key point is control. If individual creditors were allowed to seize the
debtor’s assets, an orderly liquidation or reorganization would obviously be
impossible. That is, employees, secured creditors, or the state, favored in most
systems, might well lose value to unsecured commercial creditors in the rush for
assets. The control provided by the moratorium or stay ensures that these competitors
are restrained, while other doctrines105 ensure that the bankruptcy regime will control
the liquidation or recapitalization of the debtor’s assets and the distribution of
resulting value to the preferred beneficiaries.106 It has long been recognized that the
collective proceeding that is bankruptcy is required to maximize value,107 but it is
equally true that the control imposed by bankruptcy law is essential to enforcing the
inequality of distribution—that is, priorities—mandated by each legislature. A recent
study by a Spanish scholar makes a persuasive historical case for understanding the
role of bankruptcy as a system for enforcing priorities and defeating a general or
overall equality of distribution.108
105

The most important additional rules for enforcing priority systems are (i) the vesting of control of
the debtor’s assets in someone equivalent to our trustee in bankruptcy and (ii) the avoiding powers,
which recapture assets that were transferred before bankruptcy.
106
For this reason, the very absence of control identifies some of the beneficiaries chosen by a
particular regime. For example, in some countries the opening moratorium does not apply to labor
(employee or union) claims. See, e.g., Mexican Statement, supra note xx, Chapter II. In others,
secured creditors and their collateral are exempt from its reach. See, e.g., Canadian Statement, supra
note xx, at I.C.d (in liquidation cases). The practical effect of their exemption may be to maximize the
value of their recoveries, while lowering the overall recovery for beneficiaries generally. It is not
coincidental that the same creditors exempted from the stay in a particular system are invariably
favored within a bankruptcy proceeding as well. ALI Mexican Statement, supra note xx, II.F.1,
IV.F.1 (labor claims).
ALI Canadian Statement, supra note xx, I.C.6 (secured claims). It would be a serious conceptual error
to think of these claimants as excluded from the bankruptcy process in such a system, because that
process, starting with the moratorium that restrains their competitors from seizing the debtor’s assets
ahead of them, is designed specifically to benefit them. Their exemption from the stay is the next best
thing to an advance distribution of assets. It is for that reason that their exclusion from the stay’s
coverage is not inconsistent with the assertion that control is essential to any bankruptcy regime. A
striking example of the effect of exclusion in our law, recently enacted, is the exemption from the stay
for certain financial contracts, which amounts to a substantial priority for certain creditors, even
though they are often unsecured under state law. Bankruptcy Code §§362(b)(6-7), (17); 555-56; 559.
107
JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note xx, at 5.
108
Jose Maria Garrido, Tratado de las Prefencias del Credito (2000). Professor Garrido describes a
tension between the pro rata rule of the ius mercantile and the priority-heavy “concurso” schemes of
government systems in Italy, Spain, and elsewhere in Europe as bankruptcy law was developing in the
17th Century. He suggest that the purpose of changes in the insolvency laws in that period was to
protect the property of impecunious nobles. Necessary to that end were the creation of priorities and
control of the entire process by a publicly appointed administrator. Id. at 232-33. [Translation to
English by Jonathon Pratter (Tarleton Law Library) and Gloria E. Avila-Villalha, on file with the
author].
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In a model of bankruptcy based on the goal of enforcement of priorities,
equality of distribution still has a role, but only to enforce equality (generally
understood as pro rata distribution) within a given priority class. Just as bankruptcy
control is necessary to ensure the priority of employees as a group, for example, that
control also ensures that each employee will share pro rata in the enjoyment of that
priority, rather than having favored employees, lucky employees, or more aggressive
employees do better than the rest. It is in that sense that equality of distribution is an
important goal of bankruptcy.
The necessary conclusion is that bankruptcy exists to enforce a set of
priorities, but can be used to enforce any set of priorities that might be chosen by
policymakers. The only thing that is essential to bankruptcy is that the bankruptcy
regime get control of the debtor’s assets and be able to dispose definitively of its
liabilities, so the assets can be safely sold or recapitalized and the value distributed to
the chosen beneficiaries.109 Bankruptcy could in theory be used to enforce a priority
system of non-priority— that is, complete equality—although it does not appear that
even one such system is extant. Thus priority is the usual goal of bankruptcy, but no
particular choice of priority is necessary. On the other hand, control is the sine qua
non of any bankruptcy system.110
At this point, it is necessary to introduce the idea of neutrality, a concept
never identified in the literature about bankruptcy, but almost as central in many
bankruptcy systems as control. This concept deserves an article of its own, but can
only be briefly introduced here and modestly elaborated in Part V. If equality is not
the necessary centerpiece of a bankruptcy priority regime, it can be argued that
neutrality occupies that position. The core idea is this: if a bankruptcy involves
competing interests, then control may be exercised either impartially or with
partiality to one interest or another. If the policymaker recognizes both interests as
worthy of protection, then its policy requires neutrality in the default manager.111
To get an initial idea how this point applies in the context of secured credit,
suppose that Congress has decided to accept without reservation the claim that
secured credit is the most efficient form of credit in every instance.112 On that basis,
it enacts a bankruptcy system that has only dominant secured parties as
109

In a reorganization, debts may be restructured by being reduced and extended in payment or the
company or its assets may be sold as a unit to pay some or all of the debts. In a restructuring, value is
created by effectively recapitalizing the assets at the restructuring “price” because the new capital
structure is thought to be sufficiently reduced that the assets can provide a sufficient return on the
restructured investment. Often that process requires new loans or new equity investments as well.
Thus the usage “recapitalization of assets.”
110
As noted earlier, this statement includes the notion that pervasive control from which favored
creditors are excepted is perfectly consistent with bankruptcy as a system of priority enforcement. CR
earlier footnote.
111
It may be that the importance of neutrality has been ignored because it was too obvious, like
speaking in prose.
112
CR.
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beneficiaries.113 In such a system, the manager of the default has only to ensure that
the dominant secured party gets the maximum possible recovery. Then its work is
done. Although the British Parliament and courts never explicitly adopted such a
rule, it has been argued that the receiver system frequently operated as if that were
the rule.114 And that system made sense once a decision was made to protect a
dominant secured party (there, the floating-charge holder) at all hazards. If there is
only one beneficiary, the management of the general default should be in the hands
of that beneficiary or its agent, which will then act in the beneficiary’s best
interests.115
On the other hand, Congress might have decided instead to have a system
that encourages the market to decide on the appropriate combination of secured
credit, unsecured credit, and equity financing for each business. That would be a fair
description of the present system in the United States. In such a system, the
Congressional objective of maximizing value for each class of beneficiaries would
require a neutral manager charged not merely with distribution of proceeds according
to a set of priorities, but first and foremost with managing the default and arranging
the deployment of assets so as to produce the maximum return for each class.116 Such
a task is formidable and probably cannot be achieved fully, but it would be the ideal
objective of a neutral manager in response to the Congressional policy.117
Even under the present system, an exception can be posited, in principle, to
the proposition that bankruptcy neutrality is essential to the management of a general
default. The exception is the case in which there is a valid dominant security interest
that is undersecured. That is, even assuming a near-absolute secured-credit priority
113

If Congress included ordinary secured parties holding interests in a variety of assets of the debtor,
then those interests would be in potential conflict and the result would not be a single-beneficiary
class.
114
CR.
115
Cf. Schwartz, Priority, supra note xx. In such a system, a necessary premise would be that virtually
all the working capital for the business would be supplied by the entrepreneur and the secured party, a
point of considerable interest we will not explore further here.
116
The Code explicitly requires neutrality in a trustee’s lawyer and other professional advisors to the
estate. Code §327 (“disinterestedness”). Although the Code does not require neutrality of the trustee
in so many words, the caselaw has long imposed on a trustee in bankruptcy fiduciary duties to all
those interested in the estate. Collier, Revised 15h Edition, xxx.
117
The task would be difficult because the beneficiary classes would have conflicting interests. For
example, the first priority class might be paid in full with a very low risk, low return management and
deployment of assets, while a lower priority class might be better served with a little more risk on the
hope of a little more return. CR present n. 222. This point deserves an article of its own, which it will
not get here. It should be noted, however, that a Congressional decision to give top priority to class A
is not the same as a decision that the default manager should maximize returns for that class while
ignoring the rest of Congress’ beneficiaries. Cf. Lipson, supra note xx. It is the distinction between
those two ideas—priority versus management—that explains the apparent anomaly that Congress is
obviously very concerned with debtors and unsecured creditors, yet gives no explicit priority to either.
It wants to protect the priority of certain creditors, while hoping to maximize value for lower-priority
classes at the same time. As usual, it leaves the hard-to-reconcile details to the courts.
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as in the United States, so that the secured party has a top priority in all the debtor’s
assets, it may be that the maximized value of those assets will still be less than the
amount owed to the secured party.118 In that case, it can be argued that there can be
no competing priority and no need for bankruptcy. Among other things, this
exception explains why almost all instances in which bankruptcy-waivers are
enforced are single-asset real estate cases, a point explored below.119 In that sort of
case, the control exercised by the dominant secured party is arguably all that is
necessary or perhaps appropriate.
Part IV. Contractualism and Secured Credit
A. Contractualism
A number of scholars have proposed to replace bankruptcy law with
bankruptcy bargains established by contracts between debtors and creditors. They do
not make much attempt to relate their work, each to the other, but it is fair to group
these theories as “contractualism,” understood to mean any approach that would
permit important bankruptcy rules to be modified or abrogated by contract between
the debtor and one or more creditors.120 They are vague about the role of the courts
or other institutions in enforcing the hypothetical bargains they imagine being struck,
but presumably these bargains would establish a set of legal rules governing the
recovery process or, at least, contractual waivers and exceptions to the existing
bankruptcy regime. Nearly all of the proposals that have been advanced envision a
bankruptcy bargain struck ex ante, at the time credit is granted.121
The term “proposals” with respect to contractualist writings is accurate,
because none of these approaches devotes a great deal of attention to theory as
such.122 They assume for the most part that bankruptcy should have the functions
that private parties, especially lenders, want it to have. Following Professor
Jackson,123 they assume it has no other functions. On the basis of a general notion of
market efficiency, they further assume that a private regime bargained by the parties
118

Note that this statement assumes the case in which there is not a going-concern value in excess of
the secured debt.
119
CR.
120
Professor Block-Lieb calls them “neoliberterian” theorists. Susan Block- Lieb, The Logic and
Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 Ill. L. Rev. 503, 504 (2001).
121
The exceptions include Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy
Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515 (1999) (proposing enforcement of certain waivers in bankruptcy)
[hereinafter, Schwarz, Rethinking]; and Edward S. Adams and James L. Bailie, A Privatization
Solution to the Legitimacy of PrePetition Waivers of the Automatic Stay, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1996)
(Urging acceptance of waivers of the automatic stay even while acknowledging that such waivers
amount to waivers of bankruptcy protection).
122
The description that follows draws heavily upon that found in Elizabeth Warren and Jay L.
Westbrook, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 1029-42 (4th Ed. 2001).
123
JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note xx.
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would produce a more efficient method of achieving those functions than would be
provided by any legal regime.124
On the other hand, the contractualists understand that their key difficulty is to
govern by contract an event—general default—that is collective and multi-party by
definition. They are keenly aware that parties may not ordinarily use a contract
between them to bind third parties. As a result, they devote much of their efforts to
advancing proposals by which they believe the problems of third-party rights and
multi-party relationships can be avoided in a system that turns on a private
bargain.125
One group of contractualist proposals can be called “automated
bankruptcy”126 One version of automated bankruptcy assumes a tiered system of debt
priority, so that upon a general default the lowest priority tier can either invest
sufficient funds to pay off all higher tiers or forfeit its interest entirely. Then the next
tier up the ladder has the same chance and faces the same forfeiture. If the process
reaches the top tier without payment having been made, the top tier simply takes
over ownership of the debtor and disposes of it as the holders of top-tier debt think
most advantageous.
Another approach is potentially more elaborate than automated bankruptcy. It
puts in place an entire bankruptcy system by contract. One variation on this
“complete-system” approach supplies a menu of such systems, one of which is
selected by a debtor at its corporate birth.127 Creditors can then decide whether to
extend credit to the debtor, given its selection of a particular bankruptcy system from
the menu.128 Some other advocates of a complete system by contract propose that
each new contract adopting a bankruptcy system will automatically apply to the
debtor’s prior creditors, replacing the systems that were in prior contracts.129 In this
way, what might be called the “ever-green” complete-system approach seeks to
avoid the objection that the menu system is too rigid. Finally, a third variation is
124
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more cautious. It would leave the bankruptcy system largely in place, at least in
theory, but permit bargains for waiver and replacement of certain provisions, subject
to limited post-hoc review by the courts under stated tests of fairness and
efficiency.130 A central focus of this last approach is advance, irrevocable waiver of
the automatic stay if bankruptcy should ensue, generally given in exchange for a
secured loan after the debtor is already in financial distress.
This short summary does not do justice to the extent to which these
contractualist proposals have dominated debate about bankruptcy theories over the
last decade. Article after article has proposed the privatization of the management of
financial distress through ever more-ingenious contractual schemes. On the other
hand, so preoccupied have these scholars been with the problem of third-party rights
they have devoted little attention to the institutional management of a general default
nor to explaining why a private system would be more efficient.131 They have made a
useful contribution to the literature because they have forced onto the table the
question of privatizing bankruptcy law, one inevitable in the academic epoch of Law
and Economics. In the process, their work has identified the central problems with
private management of a general default. Professor Rasmussen’s ingenious “menu”
idea, for example, put the question of public notice at the center of things, where it
belongs.132 Professor Schwartz has seen for some time the central importance to a
private system of giving an overriding priority to a single creditor.133 Professor
Schwarcz, by focusing on the phenomenon of security interests given after financial
distress has arisen, has begun an exploration of the centrality of the choice of a
manager of a general default.134
B. Secured Contractualism
The contractualists say almost nothing about secured credit. Their imagined
systems of bargained bankruptcies ignore the central pillar of credit bargaining, the
security interest, which is also the only privately bargained priority recognized in
bankruptcy laws in the United States and around the world. The critics of the
contractualists offer a number of sound arguments against their theories,135 but
largely within the same frame of reference, ignoring the relevance of the secured
130
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credit system. Yet this section will show that the existence of a highly sophisticated
system of secured credit permits achievement of all the goals of the contractualists
and solves the otherwise intractable problems presented by their proposals. The only
conceivable form of contractualism is secured contractualism.
On the other hand, that conclusion makes the contractualist project a
relatively small aspect of the debate that matters most: the costs and benefits of
secured credit. The case for secured credit at the transaction (credit-extending) stage
has been the subject of a long and inconclusive debate, leaving the claim of benefits
from a secured credit system problematic at best. Beyond that fundamental difficulty
lies a second difficult obstacle that must be overcome by proponents of secured
contractualism. As we have seen, an ordinary security interest is insufficient for
management of a general default. To be successful, contractualism requires a
dominant security interest to support its objective of privatizing management of a
general default. We will see that there are substantial concerns about giving over
management of a general default to a dominant secured party and that these concerns
must extend to any contractualist proposal.
The contractualist theorists envision a world in which creditors can bargain in
advance for an assured position in case of the debtor’s general default. A security
interest provides just that result. A dominant secured creditor that exercises
reasonable care in its arrangements will have a highly predictable legal environment
following default, in which it will control the debtor enterprise, the disposal of its
assets, and the distribution of the proceeds. Even under present law, a dominant
secured party will often be able to veto a bankruptcy. There is little more that any
contractualist could ask of a legal regime.
Without the support of a security interest, the contractualist proposals are
crippled by intractable problems. The three most important are notice, serial
contracting, and control. Bankruptcy law provides a standing notice as to the rules
governing a general default, permitting credit grantors and others (for example,
employees and venture capitalists) to make market decisions on that firm basis. As
Professor LoPucki has explained, any contractualist approach which permits
bankruptcy laws to be waived or modified must provide a method by which creditors
will know that the debtor has entered into a binding agreement concerning events
following its general default.136 The other creditors must also know the contents of
that agreement. Otherwise, market actors would have to price their contracts on
worse-case assumptions about the agreements into which their counterparties
(borrowers or traders) might have entered that would affect the actors’ risks in the
transaction. For the most part, contractualist theories have failed even to address this
problem.137 Yet the terms of an agreement for automated bankruptcy, for example,
136
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would be of pressing importance to a subsequent creditor considering extending
unsecured credit to a debtor. If that party later discovered that the debtor had
contracted for an automated bankruptcy regime in case of general default and if that
regime were binding upon the subsequent creditor, that party would recover nothing
unless it could organize (and contribute capital to) a “class” effort to buy out higher
tiers of debt. Absent notice, any creditor would have to price its credit on the risk
that such an agreement existed.138
Similar difficulties arise with respect to the complete-system approaches to
contract bankruptcy. At the heart of such a system must be an agreement binding on
third parties that a certain creditor would have the right to appoint a new manager of
the debtor’s business following default. The provisions of that agreement would be
important to various parties, including those considering entering into joint ventures
or distribution agreements with a debtor, because of the uncertainties about the
competence and conflicting interests of the new manager. To avoid inefficient
overpricing in reaction to these risks, a contractualist system must provide for the
giving of notice.139
To his credit, Professor Rasmussen sees the centrality of the notice problem,
providing for notice to the market through his “menu” approach. But his approach
does not solve the second problem, serial contracting, which is addressed by
Professor Schwartz. The difficulty arising from serial contracting is that Professor
Rasmussen’s proposal would lock the debtor into an unalterable choice of a
bankruptcy regime at an early stage in its business life, a scheme that might be
wholly unsatisfactory to its subsequent creditors and itself at a later stage.140
However, when Professor Schwartz attempts to solve that problem with his last-tocontract or ever-green approach,141 he is left with a somewhat bizarre system in
States market and therefore assumed that notice and disclosure would be a function of the securities
acts. The efficacy of that disclosure system, especially as to the purpose and effect of specific
transactions, is far less clear than it seemed to be before Enron, et al. See, e.g., Report of the
Examiner, Enron Corporation, June 30, 2003 (failures to disclose true nature of loan transactions and
“wash” transactions with major banks). See also [NYT and WSJ articles re Citigroup and Morgan
settlements with the SEC, July 29, 2003].
138
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which a bankruptcy scheme in the contract of a supplier of copy paper to the debtor
might be held binding on J.P. Morgan Chase as the debtor’s principal lender. Any
proposal that creates a hard-to-change contractual scheme (menu) or that separates
the bargaining process from a major supplier of the credit that will be at risk (evergreen) is unworkable on its face.142
Furthermore, in an ever-green contractualist system with successive
amending contracts, there would inevitably be ambiguities as to which contract was
the controlling one. How would disputes of this sort be resolved and who would
control the enterprise while they were being resolved? These issues would involve a
thousand points of important detail. The details themselves need not detain us. The
point here is that if there is to be legal enforcement of these contracts, especially in
the context of third-party rights and multi-party proceedings, all sorts of provisions
would have to be developed, adopted into law, be found wanting in various respects,
and be revised and tried again, before such a system could hope to succeed. Such a
project--fat with expense, dislocation, and risk--would never be undertaken if the end
could be achieved in another fashion. It would be academic in the worse sense of the
word. As explained below, a far simpler and more elegant solution is available by
linking contractualism to a dominant security interest, creating secured
contractualism.
However, the central difficulty for contractualists is the problem of control of
the debtor’s assets. There are two control problems: pre-default and post-default. If
the contractualist creditor is unsecured, the most intractable problem is the absence
of asset constraint143 prior to default. Even the debtor who has locked itself into one
of the menu choices proposed by Professor Rasmussen is left free to manipulate its
assets, especially through the use of multiple corporations in multiple jurisdictions
and conveyances to good-faith transferees. Certain transfers that are fraudulent or
without real benefit to the debtor might be set aside under bankruptcy law or other
laws, but many transfers to good-faith transferees are not recoverable for the benefit
of unsecured creditors.144 As noted earlier, a lawsuit against the debtor is generally
an exercise in futility.145
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Furthermore, the debtor may not be making the transfers in bad faith. Its
manipulations may be motivated by tax or financial reporting considerations, as may
have been true on some occasions with Enron, rather than an intent to defraud
creditors, but their effect may be to leave creditors with a marvelous bankruptcy
scheme vis a vis an empty shell of a debtor. An unsecured contractualist system
leaves the counterparty utterly exposed to a complete restructuring of the business
and conveyance of assets. While such transfers may be breaches of contract or even
ultra vires, they will often be effective as property transfers, leaving the
contractualist with only an unsecured claim for damages against a debtor already in
general default who will pay little or nothing to unsecured creditors.146
The easiest example of the risk of such transfers is the debtor’s grant of a
dominant security interest in violation of its bargain with the contractualist creditor.
The debtor signs a contract with the creditor containing elaborate bankruptcy
provisions. A year later, under financial pressure, the debtor grants a dominant
security interest in violation of that contract. Despite any covenants against such a
grant, the grant is fully effective under Article 9.147 Upon the debtor’s general
default, the contractualist creditor is left with an unsecured contract scheme while the
secured party is selling all the assets of the company and distributing the proceeds to
itself.148
That example invokes the wisdom of Professor Gilmore. In his famous
treatise, he gave the back of his hand to “negative covenants,” mere contractual
promises made to unsecured lenders to the effect that the debtor would not grant
security to anyone else. Professor Gilmore viewed them as nearly valueless for the
or evidence of bad faith, as “efficient breach” theory demonstrates. See generally, Peter Linzer, On
the Amorality of Contract Remedies--Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 Colum. L.
Rev. 111 (1981); Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 Colum. L.
Rev. 1365 (1982).
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reason just given.149 The elaborate contracts contemplated by the contractualists are
simply expanded versions of those illusionary bargains.150
Given that the contractualists fail to address collateral protection before
default, it is not surprising they also ignore the problems of collateral control and
enterprise control after a general default, although control is essential to their
schemes. To enforce their covenants, they would have to procure legislative
enactment of a new code with extensive provisions enforcing the rights necessary to
their proposed regime. It is not possible to manage a general default without
enterprise control, which is given to the trustee in bankruptcy by the automatic stay.
In a contractualist regime, a bristle of court orders would be required following a
general default. Even if the procedures are to be governed by contract, the new code
would have to provide default rules for all the points not covered in a given
contractual bargain and regulate the inevitable abuses that arise in reaction to all
legal innovations. For example, one element required under a system of automated
bankruptcy, although not discussed by its proponents, would be a method for
determining interim control of the defaulting enterprise while the parties to the
various automated debt instruments worked through the schemes’ contractual option
process. Who would appoint the controller pending the completion of the process?
Would it be the highest tier creditors or the lowest or a neutral party? Would the
controller’s incentive be to protect the minimum asset value, leaving the lower tiers
potentially with no remaining value or would its incentive be to maximize asset
value for all tiers although some risk would be necessary? The power to appoint the
controller would undoubtedly affect the likelihood that the appointee would choose
one path or the other. This problem is discussed further in Part V.151
These three problems--notice, serial contracting, and asset control—are
impossible to solve in the contractualist system, but are easily solved once a security
interest is granted to a dominant secured creditor.152 As discussed above, we have a
149
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highly sophisticated system of secured credit, long refined, that has largely overcome
these very difficulties. If the contractual powers desired by the contractualists are
given to a dominant secured creditor, a simple Article 9 filing would give effective
notice to the world, directly and through private credit agencies, that would solve
instantly the otherwise hopeless problems of notice. By virtue of that notice (that is,
perfection),153 the secured party would have a high level of assurance of asset
constraint and thus priority.154 The debtor could not dispose of its assets, or interests
in them, because good-faith transferees would be deterred by notice and transfers in
the teeth of notice would be recoverable. As against a dominant secured creditor, the
debtor would be well-aware that it would violate covenants at the risk of almost
instant loss of control of its entire enterprise. Finally, in the case of general default,
the dominant secured creditor would simply take enterprise control and manage
affairs in its own best interests, within broad limits. Virtually everything the
contractualists desire is available under present law to a dominant secured creditor.
This simple move would solve most of the problems to which so many lawreview pages have been devoted by providing Article 9 notice, Article 9 collateral
protection, and Article 9 enterprise control, all under well-established, routinely
and complete-system approaches, although the fundamental difficulties of a waiver proposal are
closely related. The critique of waiver proposals cannot be fully realized in this article, but five points
are key. The first is notice. Permitting enforcement of waivers will effectively make many debtors
reorganization ineligible, in the sense that bankruptcy relief will be ineffective to permit
reorganization because of the waiver. It would be very important for creditors, both those existing at
the time of waiver and future creditors, to have notice of the debtor’s dramatic change in status from a
reorganization-eligible to a reorganization-inelible debtor. An Article 9 filing would provide this
notice, albeit inadequately; no other efficacious method is apparent. Second, if the waiver is on behalf
of a dominant secured party, it is largely irrelevant because of the bankruptcy veto, explained infra.
Third, the waiver could operate on behalf of ordinary secured creditors, who may thus be able to
disable the bankruptcy process without offering an alternative system for managing a general default,
unlike a dominant secured party that can offer such a management alternative. As noted above, an
ordinary secured party does not have a legitimate economic claim to that power. Fourth, although it
seems highly unlikely such a waiver would be obtained by an unsecured creditor, the loss of
bankruptcy control would be even harder to justify if it operated in favor of an unsecured creditor who
lacks even a right to a special priority, much less the right of collateral control. Finally, and most
importantly, the incentive problem creates serious difficulties with this approach, except in the case of
the dominant secured party and few other creditors with any substantial interest. As noted earlier, this
last point may explain why most of the cases enforcing a waiver have been single-asset real estate
cases. CR.
153
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enforced existing law. A dominant security interest is the only extant method for
achieving the asset constraint and enterprise control necessary to contractualism. It is
the necessary and sufficient condition for the privatization of bankruptcy law, that is,
privatization of the management of a general default.
Yet there is a serpent in this contractualist fruit, to be discussed in the next
section.
Part V. The Problem with Secured Contractualism
On the analysis just completed, the whole contractualist project collapses into
secured credit theory, which gives rise to two sorts of serious problems for its
proponents. The first difficulty—the transactional efficiency problem--is that after
twenty-five years of debate the efficiency of secured credit remains problematic. Its
proponents in that debate have gotten no farther than the Scottish verdict, “not
proven.” Furthermore, the value of control to the secured party and its cost to the
debtor have received little attention in the efficiency debate, leaving the debate
incomplete as well as unresolved. The second difficulty is that the securedcontractualist proposal requires a certain kind of security interest, a dominant one, to
permit management of a general default as a substitute for a public bankruptcy
regime. But management by a dominant secured party raises serious and unresolved
questions in any system that encourages the extension of credit by anyone other than
a dominant secured party. These two points, which represent severe obstacles to the
contractualist project, are discussed in the next section.
A. The Efficiency of Secured Credit
For more than two decades, academics have engaged in a wide-ranging
debate about the efficiency vel non of secured credit. No other subject has dominated
commercial-law scholarship to such an extent for so long with such inconclusive
results. Yet the fact that contractualism must rest upon a secured-credit foundation
means that a positive finding for the efficiency of secured credit is essential to it.
The long debate began with a classic article by Professors Jackson and
Kronman in the Yale Law Journal in 1979.155 They asked if secured credit is socially
beneficial.156 This article was seminal indeed, as a vast law-review literature grew
from it.157 Traditionally, secured credit was thought to be useful because it reduced
the risk to the secured party, permitting a lower interest rate as well as enabling loans
155
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that might otherwise not be made at all.158 In effect, the debtor and creditor could
split a reduction in costs that followed a reduction in risk. But Jackson and Kronman
identified a difficulty with that argument: any reduction in the secured party’s risk
was necessarily accompanied by an increase in risk for unsecured parties, who would
therefore increase their charges and ration their credit, leaving the overall costs at
best the same.159
These authors, like many who followed them, were sure that secured credit
must be efficient. The task then became, in Professor LoPucki’s felicitous phrase,
like Cinderella’s sisters, trying “to fit the glass slipper” of efficiency to a theory of
secured credit.160 All the resulting theories began with debtor misbehavior, labeled
“moral hazard,” which was the common enemy of all creditors. The “moral hazard”
was that the debtor would borrow on the basis of business plan A and then operate
under business plan B.161 Plan B would have a greater upside, all of which would be
captured by the debtor, at the cost of greater risk, most of which would be borne by
the creditor. The debtor would propose to the lender, let’s say, a video shop. Then,
the lender’s money in hand, it would purchase a race car, because all of the upside of
the risky business would fall to equity owners, while the risk of failure would be
borne primarily by the lender (and the driver).162 To protect against this moral
hazard, the lender takes a security interest163 which makes it difficult for the debtor
to transfer assets and therefore difficult for it to change businesses.164
Jackson and Kronman postulated that the cost of “monitoring” the debtor was
the key. If taking the security interest reduced the secured creditor’s risk and
monitoring costs enough it would outbalance the increase in the unsecured creditor’s
added risk and monitoring costs whenever the unsecured creditor had lower
monitoring costs than the creditor who wished to be secured. Professor Schwartz in
158
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two classic articles destroyed this and other monitoring arguments and they have
been largely abandoned.165 Yet many other defenders of secured credit proffered
other feet to fit the efficiency slipper, only to face withering criticism from Schwartz
and others.
In general, the task was to find a benefit to other creditors that offset the
increased risk to those creditors. Schwartz argued that a classic economic model
would always return the overall costs to equilibrium, rising on the unsecured side as
they fell on the secured side.166 He also argued that every theory that showed the
efficiency of secured credit necessarily proved too much. If secured credit were
efficient on the theory presented, all debt would be issued secured, a pattern far
different from the reality observed in the financial markets.167 A number of articles
written since have attempted to show that there are a series of reasons that security
would be used in one circumstance or industry and not in another, so that security
might be efficient despite its failure to be ubiquitous.168 However, these articles have
not succeeded in establishing a persuasive response to Schwartz’ first point. That is,
they have not been able to demonstrate a benefit to unsecured creditors that would
reduce the increase in their costs arising from the loss of access to the collateral in
case of default. Absent that reduction, no mechanism has been persuasively proposed
by which the increase in unsecured credit costs would not equal or exceed the
reduction of cost to the secured party, producing a net loss of wealth.
Given the failure to achieve that goal, there remained the question: why does
secured credit flourish if it is inefficient? Professor LoPucki’s conclusion was that
the parties who bore the primary effects of its inefficiency were involuntary
creditors, especially tort creditors, who could not raise their “prices” to offset the
costs imposed by security interests.169 Thus the benefits of security interests obtained
by Citigroup are built on the backs of the maimed and killed, an incendiary
proposition that has drawn heated responses.170 Subsequently, Professors Bebchuk
and Fried have further developed that point, arguing that not only tort creditors but
many other unsecured creditors are “weakly adjusting” or non-adjusting.171 To the
extent they cannot adjust their costs or ration their extensions of credit, there is a
surplus created from which the debtor and the secured party can split the benefits of
165
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security. On this theory, of course, there is no efficiency gain from secured credit,
but only a redistribution of a distinctly troubling sort.
Until recently, the only writer to propose a solution related to the concept of
control was Professor Scott.172 Although he did not elaborate the idea of a dominant
security interest, he clearly had in mind a dominant secured party. The social benefit
that would arise from a security interest would often be part of a long-term
relationship between lender and debtor. The security interest would give the lender a
tether that would do more than prevent “misbehavior;” it would provide the lender a
chance to educate and guide the debtor in prudent directions through a financial
expertise that many debtors would lack. The leverage produced by the security
interest Professor Scott called “hostage value.”173 It arose from what this article
would call asset constraint and more particularly business-plan constraint.174
Presumably, the benefit of the mentoring and restraint would flow not only to the
debtor but to all the unsecured creditors as well, ensuring that the ship that carried
their common financial destinies would have a better chance to remain afloat.175
Unfortunately, this sophisticated argument has not been much developed in the
nearly twenty years since it was presented.176
From the perspective of the defenders of security, the result of these years of
debate was at best inconclusive.177 No one was able to make the case that there is
some benign general effect of secured credit that outweighs the zero-sum
relationship between its reduction of the secured party’s costs and its increase in the
costs of unsecured creditors, adjusting or not. Given that, Professor Mann decided to
ask a new question: what do secured creditors believe they get from security
interests? What do they value about security interests? He undertook rigorously
structured empirical research, a combination of interviews with lenders and
examination of a large number of lending files.
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Professor Mann marshaled evidence from his researches to show that control
was the central benefit to secured parties, with priority upon sale a distant second.178
This finding went to the heart of the prior debate, because the problem of equilibrium
in the allocation of priority was the central difficulty raised by Professor Schwartz
and addressed by a generation of scholars. If, as Professor Mann demonstrated,
control is key to the benefits of secured credit to the secured party, then control must
be essential to secured credit theory, including any claims about efficiency. But
except for Professor Scott, the debate had little to say about control. While Professor
Mann’s work was enormously valuable, it did not attempt to resolve the efficiency
issue179 and little has been done by others to build on his work.180
This brief summary of thousands of law-review pages demonstrates that the
result of the debate concerning the efficiency of secured credit from the perspective
of the debt-capital system as a whole is inconclusive and incomplete. It is
inconclusive because of the failure to demonstrate that the Schwartz, LoPucki, and
Bebchuk/Fried critiques are substantially unfounded. If those critiques are cogent,
secured credit may inefficient in many circumstances. The debate is also is
incomplete, because the benefits and costs of control in its various aspects has been
almost entirely ignored. No one, even Professor Scott, has attempted to include the
positive value of this material factor in all of the equations written about the
efficiency of secured credit. Equally important, no one has attempt to include in
those equations the costs that may be associated with the diminution of debtor
control, especially in the case of a dominant security interest. Indeed, the special
benefits and costs associated with dominant security interests have barely been
mentioned, much less analyzed or measured.
As things stand, it is quite possible that secured credit produces net
inefficiency rather than an efficiency gain when viewed across a wide range of
transactions. Yet that conclusion would doom contractualism. Adoption of
contractualism would require wholesale adoption of dominant security interests, a
state quite foreign (literally as well as figuratively) to the United States market.181 If
178
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secured credit may be inefficient, always or often, then a wholesale shift in the
United States debt market to one in which dominant security interest are universal or
even typical would seem a very risky experiment and one unlikely to be undertaken.
If that is true, contractualism is not a serious alternative to the existing system.
Efficiency aside, there is an irony in the fact that contractualists are primarily
interested in large public companies.182 These are the very companies least likely to
grant dominant security interests.183 Thus they find themselves required to assert that
the large companies that disdain dominant security interests now will be eager to
adopt them when they are linked to a contractualist system. That proposition is
highly implausible.
B. The Incentive Problem
Beyond the general arguments about the efficiency of secured credit,
contractualism assumes management of a general default by a person or persons
designated by contract. As we have seen, contractualism necessarily rests on a
dominant security interest, so that the assumption must be management by a secured
creditor or its designee. Yet the whole question of management of the recovery
process in a privatized system has been ignored, despite the fact that control of
collateral—indeed, control of the enterprise following default—is essential to
contractualism and available only through a dominant security interest.
Most of the vast efficiency literature assumes a dominant security interest
without much serious effort to distinguish it from an ordinary security interest or to
suggest that the products of a blanket lien, which are business constraint and
enterprise control,184 are different from the rights and circumstances of ordinary
secured parties. As we have seen, however, a dominant secured party is in a very
different position than an ordinary secured party both before and after default. One
of the most important differences is that enterprise control permits a dominant
secured party to manage a general default and to sell a business as a going-concern,
realizing going-concern value. Realization of going-concern value is one of the most
important rationales for bankruptcy reorganization, so the dominant secured party
might offer an alternative to the public system in the Bankruptcy Code, which is
precisely what contractualism is designed to do. However, management of a general
default by a dominant secured party is problematic. One important reason is the
incentive problem.
The incentive problem applies to both ordinary secured parties and dominant
secured parties. It arises in ordinary debt-enforcement as well as in a general default.
182
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Any creditor-controlled sale--the sale aspect of what we have called “collateral
control”185--gives rise to a serious risk of socially undesirable results.186 Specifically,
creditor control risks realization of substantially less than the full value of the asset
being sold. These risks are well-recognized. Indeed, even the drafters of the Revised
Article 9, despite their profound commitment to vindicating the rights of secured
parties, have attempted to address some of these concerns in the debt-enforcement
process.187 A full discussion of the details of this problem is another article, but the
main points are described below. It is important in a number of contexts, but it is of
the highest order of importance when the issue is management of a general default
by a dominant secured party.
There are two aspects to the problem. The first is a classic “free-rider”
problem because the secured party lacks incentives to achieve efficient and socially
desirable results. The second is the risk of self-interested behavior leading to socially
suboptimal results. Exemplary of the risks created is the fact that both types of
incentive difficulties may cause secured lenders to want to liquidate a debtor quickly
to maximize the value of their security interests, even if delayed liquidation or
reorganization might be in the best interests of other stakeholders.188
The free-rider problem arises from the obvious fact that the secured party
managing collateral sales has no incentive to realize more than the amount of its
debt. Anything above that amount must be distributed to other secured parties, the
bankruptcy trustee, or the debtor, none of whom bear the costs and risks of the
sales.189 Although article 9 imposes significant procedural requirements for secured185
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party sales,190 these provisions leave a broad zone of reasonableness within which
quite different sale values might be obtained. As we have seen, great gaps separate
liquidation value, market value, and going-concern value, but the secured party has
no incentive to realize more than the value that will pay the secured debt in full.
Imagine the asset-realization department at a finance company.191 The
manager estimates that the assets of General Kompute can be quickly sold to realize
sufficient proceeds to pay the company’s secured debt in full. Is she likely to do the
job herself or give it to the best and most creative marketer in the department? Surely
not, if she is the rational maximizer we usually suppose people to be. Because
satisfaction of the lender’s interest will be simple, surely she will give the job to the
dumbest asset-disposal person in the office, the one hired solely because he was
qualified as someone’s brother-in-law. She will also give the brother-in-law a list of
Article 9 procedural requirements, requirements designed to be idiot-proof in most
circumstances.192 As a result, if substantially higher values could have been realized
by a highly competent seller investing time and resources, they will be lost in this
commonplace circumstance, to the injury of other stakeholders.193 Within a broad
zone of reasonableness,194 the secured creditor will not be liable for that loss of value
and arguably should not be, given its lack of incentives and the need to give the
creditor a reasonable degree of flexibility in managing sales.195 In the context of that
branch of secured credit law devoted to enforcement of particular debts in a single
default, this balance between efficiency and protection of other possible claimants
may be reasonable.
The second part of the incentive problem has a somewhat darker moral hue.
Indeed, it fills that near void in the literature concerning the “moral hazards” of
creditors as a complement to the oft-discussed moral hazards of debtors.196 The
problem is the creditor’s positive incentive to acquire the collateral at its own sale at
a very low price and then re-sell the collateral at a much higher price for its own
account. The hazard is created by two legal rules. The first is the flexible-sale rule
already discussed, which grants a broad zone of reasonableness in the advertising
and conduct of a sale. The second rule permits a secured party to “bid in” at its own
190
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sale. That is, the secured party is allowed to use the debt owed to it in lieu of actual
cash payment for any bid it may make at its own sale.197 Thus, if the creditor is owed
$100,000, it can bid any amount up to $100,000 and defeat any lesser bid, without
having to produce cash.
In both judicial and private auction sales, there are often strict requirements
for a bidder other than the secured party. In particular, the bidder may have to bring
sufficient cash to cover its bid or to provide cash payment very shortly after the
bidding. For this and other reasons, it is often the case that few other bidders appear
at foreclosure and repossession sales. This fact combines with the bidding-in rules to
make it possible for secured parties to buy at their own sales at a price well below
market values while avoiding sanctions for violating Article 9 notice and sale
procedures.
The classic recent instance was the sale of the infamous Brentwood home of
O.J. Simpson.198 Although the sale was in the real estate context rather than the sale
of personal property, the economic factors were typical. At the well-attended
foreclosure sale (!), the bank holding the mortgage bought the property for the
amount of the mortgage ($2.6 million) “bid in,” plus $31,000. It thus defeated the
only other active bidder, who began the bidding at the amount of the mortgage, plus
one dollar. Less than a month later, the bank listed the property for sale for $3.95
million, the approximate price for which it sold about six months later.199
This sort of circumstance creates a temptation for the secured party to
underbid at its own sale and then to resell for a substantial profit. Whether this result
is abusive or merely self-interested, the consequence may be that far less value will
be received at an Article 9 collateral sale than would be achieved by a seller anxious
to maximize that value. The value that might have been obtained over and above the
amount of the secured debt we may call “excess value.”
In the context of debt-enforcement, absent a general default, Article 9’s
resolution of the competing values and risks is plausible, although still
controversial.200 It can be argued that commercial debtors are able to protect
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themselves against the loss of excess value. Furthermore, other claimants against a
debtor are not generally identified outside of a general default. When the discounted
risks of creditor-controlled sales are balanced against the real gains from the flexible
Article 9 sale provisions,201 it can be argued that the drafters have struck the right
balance in the context of debt enforcement.202
Once a general default has occurred, however, the proper balance may be
very different. In the recovery process following a general default, we find a debtor
in general financial distress and a number of other claimants to any excess value.
These considerations are central to the explanation for the trumping of the collateralcontrol right in bankruptcy even as to a dominant secured party that could potentially
obtain going-concern value.203 Protection of the other claimants requires that a
neutral bankruptcy controller conduct the management of the assets and their
redeployment or recapitalization. Where excess value can be obtained, the secured
party would still receive its full priority payment, but there would be something left
for the other claimants. By seizing control, the bankruptcy regime protects the
secured party’s priority right, while also achieving the bankruptcy purpose of the
maximum distribution for all the chosen beneficiaries.204 Among other things, this
point clearly distinguishes the branch of financial-distress law concerned with the
secured party’s enforcement of a particular debt205 from its enforcement in the
context of general default. It is when a general default has occurred and the recovery
process has begun that other claimants can be identified, implicating the collective
purposes of bankruptcy.206
The incentive problem just described is just one aspect of the larger problem
of management of the recovery process in a way that protects the various interests
chosen by Congress as beneficiaries of the Bankruptcy Code. Suppose, for example,
that Congress adopted the automated bankruptcy scheme proposed by Professor
Bebchuk.207 Although his proposal does not address the necessary interlude between
general default and exercise of his various options up the ladder of priority, it is
obvious that process would take some time, especially in a large public company and
especially in the typical case where there is a desperate shortage of necessary
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information about the financial condition of the company, information crucial to the
investment decisions about to be made at each tier.208
During this interim period, someone has to manage the company and its
business. That management may profoundly effect the situation of the interested
parties. A manager appointed by the first, or lowest, tier of investors may be likely to
take some significant risks with the company’s assets209 seeking an increase in asset
value sufficient to cover the position of that lowest tier.210 Any manager who failed
to do so would be very unlikely to receive another appointment from a bottom-tier
creditor class. If the top tier appoints the manager, however, we may fairly predict
that the business will be managed into a coma of risk avoidance if that is necessary
to protect that minimum remaining value that will satisfy the top tier of investors.
Indeed, managers seeking top tier appointments may actually aim for short-term
value reduction, which after bankruptcy might leave the top tier investors with an
appreciating asset as the business cycle continues. Thus the incentive problem exists
in any system in which there are competing claimants with different priorities or
otherwise differing interests.211
The consequence of the incentive problem for secured creditors is that
bankruptcy must trump collateral control rights, whether or not going-concern value
is obtainable, because of the risk that a creditor-controlled sale will sacrifice excess
value. Bankruptcy serves as a mechanism by which private parties can determine
whether that trump will be invoked. That is, in the circumstance of general default,
the debtor and other claimants hold an option to file bankruptcy and thereby to
invoke its protection for all beneficiaries. It is plausible that the debtor and unsecured
208
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parties have the right set of incentives to act as bankruptcy gatekeepers. If they do
not believe there is a general default or if they do not believe there is a reasonable
chance to obtain excess value, over and above the secured party’s debt, they are
unlikely to accept the costs and risks necessary to generate the collective trump
represented by a bankruptcy petition.212 In those situations, they may conclude the
secured party might as well have the collateral control and conduct the sale.
On the other hand, where there is a general default and other claimants
believe that the business may realize excess value, whether by sale or restructuring,
they can invoke bankruptcy and ensure negation of the secured party’s collateral
control. By giving the bankruptcy option to those most likely to suffer from the
effects of the secured-creditor incentive problem, the law provides private parties
with a choice between private secured-creditor control and public bankruptcy
control.
Subject to the possible effects of a de facto bankruptcy veto,213 current United
States bankruptcy law clearly follows the model proposed here, providing the option
of the bankruptcy trump for the protection of beneficiaries other than a secured party.
It provides that secured creditors should not be allowed to sell collateral after a
general default if the realizable value of the collateral is likely to exceed the secured
debt, either in liquidation or reorganization. If there is such value, then, as the
analysis would predict, the automatic stay cannot be lifted at all under section
362(d)(2)214 and will rarely be lifted for lack of adequate protection under section
362(d)(1).215 Unless the stay is lifted, the secured creditor’s collateral control
remains negated. The point is driven home by the fact that all of the burdens in
adequate protection litigation are on the trustee (DIP) except the burden to prove
there is equity in the property. The presence of value in excess of the secured debt
requires bankruptcy control to maximize returns for all beneficiaries. If the
bankruptcy controller is prepared to exercise that control, the secured party is
required to show there is no excess value or to yield to the bankruptcy trump. In the
case of the dominant secured party, existence of the “bankruptcy veto” may defeat
this statutory scheme as a practical matter, because of the secured party’s control of
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all of the resources of the estate,216 but the statutory scheme demonstrates the intent
and purpose of existing law.
While the incentive problem is logical and intuitive, it has not been
demonstrated empirically. Some of the empirical work done by Professor Mann may
cast doubt on its importance as a factual matter. In a sample of 72 commercial loan
files identified by the lender as “problem loans,” he found no evidence of secured
creditors sacrificing excess value in the sale of collateral. Specifically, he found that
most often debtors paid the loans from refinancing, sales of collateral, or continued
business operations thanks to the lender’s forbearance from enforcement. In only
three cases did the lender sell the collateral and it lost money in each of those cases,
suggesting there was no excess value to forfeit in those instances. Mann’s interviews
suggested that the reason for so few enforcement actions was the loan officers’
conviction that seizing collateral meant a nearly certain loss.
Mann’s work is very helpful, but it is well short of showing that the incentive
problem does not exist. As he concedes, the size and nature of his sample makes the
data suggestive at most. He was deliberately sampling the “middle” case of loans,
problematic but not in bankruptcy or foreclosure.217 Although many of the debtors
refinanced their loans with “his” lenders, his methodology did not provide for
following those debtors following the refinance, so we do not know their ultimate
fate or the fate of their assets. His work strongly supports the conclusions that most
problem loans work out and that formal legal actions, whether under part 6 of Article
9 or in bankruptcy, are relatively rare. It does not tell us to what extent the incentive
problem should be a serious concern in the cases that do go to legal action. His
conclusion rests strongly on the belief of loan officers that liquidations mean loss.
That conclusion is consistent with the literature as to the effect of forced sales,218 but
does not tell us what happens in the universe of cases that go into bankruptcy,
especially Chapter 11 reorganization, because not a single one of the 72 cases in his
primary sample ended in bankruptcy of any kind.219 As Professor Mann so ably
demonstrates, bankruptcy or repossession represents the unusual case.
What results obtain in a bankruptcy, especially a reorganization bankruptcy,
remains for future empirical report. It may be, for example, that Mann’s refinancing
debtors were the ones that had excess value, over and above their existing secured
loans, and that is why they were able to refinance. On the other hand, it would
generally be conceded that bankruptcies are fairly often filed where the lenders are
oversecured—that is, where there is value in the collateral in excess of the secured
216
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debt, so the incentive problem could be presented if there were secured-creditor
control of the general default. Until further data appear, logic and intuition are joined
by substantial anecdotal evidence220 to suggest that the incentive problem is a serious
one in a significant number of cases that require legal intervention. The fact that the
incentive problem was perceived as operative and harmful in Britain offers some
empirical proof as well.
As explained earlier,221 neutrality is a necessary concept in a system for
managing a general default in any system in which the policymaker provides for
multiple beneficiaries and charges the manager with maximizing value for all of
them. A dominant secured party cannot be a neutral manager and its management
creates a serious potential of loss for other beneficiaries. It is just that result that
provided the impetus for a major restructuring of the system in Britain.222
Part VI. Future Empirical Evidence
A. Abandonment of Administrative Receivership in Britain
A further blow for contractualists is the fact that a long-established,
functioning system very near to secured contractualism has been abolished in one of
the most successful commercial societies in the world.223 The British system
220
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described earlier is very similar to a contractualist system. In effect, it permits
liquidation or going-concern sale through an entirely private system of managing the
recovery process. It is in almost every respect what the contractualists theorists
propose, with the addition of the dominant security interest this article has shown is
necessary for the success of their project. Yet Britain has adopted legislation
designed to abolish or radically change this system in the direction of the sort of
reorganization procedures found in Chapter 11 and the other modern reorganization
regimes emerging around the world, a change called “a seismic shift for the country
that invented . . . privately appointed receivers.224 From the perspective of English
lenders, proposals to abolish motherhood and the flag would pale in comparison.225
The reforms may have the effect of altering the commercial lending market in Britain
profoundly. They overturn over a century of well-established British law. Obviously,
the perceived need for reform was very great.
The reforms, which come into effect during 2003, prohibit the appointment of
an “administrative receiver” out of court under a debenture, the power that was
central to the position of a floating charge holder throughout the twentieth century.226
Instead, an “administrator” will be appointed. The appointment may be by the court,
by the company, or by the debentureholder, but the administrator’s responsibility
will be to the court. The administrator is explicitly charged with attending to the
interests of all creditors and with seeking a restructuring of the company, rather than
a liquidation. These provisions work a conceptual revolution in British financial law.
The reasons for this radical change included a conviction that secured
creditors acting in their own interests were failing to permit or encourage
reorganization (in Britain, “rescue”) of viable businesses, an important aspect of the
Anderson, The Australian Corporate Rescue Regime:Bold Experiment or Sensible Policy?, 10 Intl.
Insov. Rev. 81 (2001).
224
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incentive problem.227 Specifically, a conviction arose that the balance in financial
law in Britain was skewed too far in favor of the lender and against the entrepreneur,
discouraging the development of an entrepreneurial culture like that in the United
States.228
Abandonment of an essentially contractualist regime by an advanced and
sophisticated commercial society, especially on the stated grounds, is a devastating
commentary on the social value of the contractualist project, especially when the
system seems to be moving toward abandonment or serious decline in other
developed countries in the Commonwealth. Secured credit may have its uses, but in
Britain it has come to be perceived as materially suboptimal when used to support a
system that in the midst of the economic crisis following a general financial default
hands over complete control of the recovery process to a secured creditor.
B. Empirical Work
Establishment of the fact that privatization of the management of general
defaults must rest upon a dominant security interest generates a considerable
empirical agenda. The top item must be a further exploration of the British
experience, which has been a “natural experiment” for the ideas of the
contractualists, who must start with the hypothesis that the British were wrong to
think that the receivership system had serious flaws. In the United States, an
important object of inquiry would be actual experience with management of general
defaults by secured creditors. That would require an opportunity to examine
creditors’ files systematically, with all its attendant difficulties, but would follow a
path already blazed by Professor Mann. It might also be revealing to study
bankruptcy files to compare recoveries by general creditors in cases with or without
secured parties, both dominant and ordinary. Yet another significant question would
be the frequency and extent of the exercise of the bankruptcy veto and the results of
dominant secured party management.
Because of the difficulties with these types of inquiries, however, these issues
are among those that might be illuminated by “gaming.” Both game theory and
actual game experiments, using players given an appropriate set of rules and
rewards, might suggest the existence and strength of various incentives, both positive
and perverse, that are difficult to study in the wild.
Part VII. Summary and Implications of the Control Model
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By establishing the fundamental elements of a model that links secured credit
and bankruptcy and identifies control as the central issue in the law governing the
recovery process for distressed businesses, this article has explained why control is
the governing issue and has begun the process of identifying the key implications of
that finding. It has also introduced the concept of neutrality and its relationship to the
case for public management of general defaults.
A bankruptcy regime exists to enforce a set of priorities chosen by legislators.
A study of bankruptcy laws around the world reveals that no particular set of priority
choices, including a choice of general equality, is essential to bankruptcy, but that
the control necessary to enforce the chosen priorities is essential. Another way to
state that conclusion is that most priority decisions are exogenous to bankruptcy
law,229 arising from efficiency and distributional goals and ideas of fairness that are
external to bankruptcy policy as such.230 Control decisions, by contrast, are central to
bankruptcy policy.231
The struggle for control of the recovery process is ultimately between a
public and a private ordering. The primary approach to privatization is
contractualism. This discussion has shown that the only plausible form of
contractualism is secured contractualism. The reason is that contractualism requires
control of a debtor’s assets, not merely priority in the proceeds of their sale, and only
secured credit law provides both outside of bankruptcy. We have looked more deeply
to see that contractualism requires both pre-default constraint and post-default
control. Further, it requires complete constraint and control, which can be provided
only by a dominant security interest. Thus the constraints and controls provided by a
dominant security interest are essential to a privatized, contractual bankruptcy
regime.
229
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Control is the intersection and linkage between the major components of the
recovery process, secured-credit law and bankruptcy law. Although the elaboration
of that proposition must await another day, the centrality of control to the question of
contractualism, the most discussed reform program in the field in recent years, is the
key step. Because control is central to realization of maximum value for the
beneficiaries chosen by Congress, and because there will be conflicts of interest
among beneficiaries as to the best management for maximization of each
beneficiary’s interest, management by any one creditor or creditor interest will often
be inconsistent with the Congressional scheme. If the law establishes multiple
beneficiaries, only a neutral manager will maximize value appropriately.
Necessarily, any attempt to modify priorities or control by contract must therefore be
inconsistent with those policy choices. On the other hand, where policy choices and
specific circumstances result in only one class of beneficiaries—as with an
undersecured dominant secured party—then control by that class may be
appropriate.232
Although secured contractualism has not been discussed by the
contractualists, it is clear that the central issues that must be addressed by them are a)
the transactional efficiency of secured credit; and b) the efficiency and fairness of
management of the recovery process by a secured creditor in any system that
encourages credit extensions by other sorts of creditors.233 The first issue requires a
new look at transactional efficiency that includes valuation of control, which has
never been addressed directly in the vast American legal literature on the subject.
The second issue, post-default control, is similarly unexamined in that literature, but
requires serious and intense scrutiny if we are to understand the ramifications of the
proposed privatization of the management of general defaults. We have made a start
on that question in this paper by exploring the incentive problem.
The control model carries a number of implications for the theory of the law
governing financial defaults. Their development will have to await other articles, but
it may be useful to discuss the relationship of one concept to the control model,
albeit in a preliminary way. The concept is “lender control.”
In two recent articles,234 Professors Baird and Rasmussen have advanced our
understanding by putting forward control as a central issue in bankruptcy law.
Although they have not named the phenomenon they have identified, to call it
232
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“lender control” will be close to the mark.235 They assert that lenders have recently
come to dominate the Chapter 11 cases of large public companies and that this
development should be applauded.236 Although their approach is stimulating and
helpful, their description of the phenomenon presents some serious difficulties. Its
empirical deficiencies have been well-addressed by Professor LoPucki,237 and it
presents some important conceptual problems as well. The discussion here will
assume without conceding that their factual assertion is correct.238 It will be limited
to two points: comparing and contrasting the type of lender control they discuss with
control by a dominant secured party; and identifying some of the problematic aspects
of that sort of lender control.
In one important respect, the Baird and Rasmussen analysis is supportive of
the model presented here. They see security interests as an important aspect of lender
control in many cases.239 They do not distinguish, however, between ordinary and
dominant security interests nor between pre-default and post-default control. As to
the first, one key issue implied by the analysis presented in this article is whether
control by an ordinary secured party is legitimate. For example, is it appropriate,
economically or legally, for a secured party with a security interest only in accounts
receivable or only in equipment to attempt to hold reorganization hostage to its
demands, even though it is not a dominant secured party and therefore incapable of
realizing going-concern value itself? This power might be called “hostage value,”
but seems very different from the concept put forward under that name by Professor
Scott.240 “Threat value” might be closer. This article stops short of addressing this
interesting question, which is answered firmly in the negative by Chapter 11 of the
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Bankruptcy Code.241 Given that Baird and Rasmussen do not make the ordinarydominant distinction, it is not surprising that they do not address it either.
Indeed, these two authors seem unsure whether the lenders whose control
they celebrate are secured or not. They have difficulty identifying the “creditors” that
will take charge. They flirt with the idea of a secured creditor playing that role,242 but
never settle on it, although many of their exemplary cases involve security
interests.243 In short, their argument for a system in which “investors” contract for
“control rights” comes to the edge of presenting a model based on a dominant
security interest, but stops short of making any connection between bankruptcy and
secured credit.
Baird and Rasmussen do not ignore the pre-default period, but they offer
evidence as to control only during the recovery process. As to the period beginning
with the initiation of the lending relationship, they merely assert that “investors”
have established methods of pre-default control, without offering any evidence other
than a citation to two articles that are purely theoretical.244 It does not seem that any
real company has yet adopted the financial structures suggested by either of the cited
articles. Of course, a dominant security interest would provide the desired control,
but they do not propose it as their model. Indeed, they do not propose any method for
solving the problems of contractualist lack of control discussed in Part IV of this
article because they do not recognize those problems. Without that discussion, there
can be no plausible model for control of the debtor’s assets by contract or for control
of the general-default process, as we saw in Part IV.
The only pre-bankruptcy control that is discussed in the End article seems to
refer to post-distress control—that is, control that lenders obtain prior to bankruptcy
but after the debtor has fallen into serious financial trouble.245 The authors may well
have in mind that the lenders obtain dominant security interests in that context,
although they do not say so. To the extent they are not relying on a dominant security
interest, the problem presented shades into that presented by post-bankruptcy
control, to which we now turn.
According to the End article, one important way lenders have seized postdefault control is through the post-bankruptcy lending process.246 This suggestion
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raises both empirical and normative issues. Why and how has this happened? Is it a
desirable development? Baird and Rasmussen devote little attention to either issue.
Absent a dominant security interest, it is not clear why post-bankruptcy
lenders (usually called “DIP lenders”) should have great leverage in a Chapter 11, at
least at the outset of the case. Odd as it seems to many non-Americans, DIP lending
is highly sought after and competitive in the United States. There is no need,
ordinarily, to go hat in hand to existing lenders to beg for more money. So why
would the Debtor In Possession (DIP) give control to the DIP lenders, as Baird and
Rasmussen say they do? If the authors are correct in their factual claims, it is clear
that serious empirical inquiry—by questionnaire, by data compilation, or
otherwise—should be undertaken to answer this question. Could it be that
management, which controls the DIP, sometimes abandons the equity owners and
other company constituencies in favor of lenders who tacitly agree to maintain
management in control? That result would be somewhat consistent with the positions
of those who claim that management should have an exclusive duty to creditors once
the business is “in the vicinity” of insolvency,247 but would seem highly problematic
to those who disagree.248 One can imagine a number of motives and pathways by
which lender control through management might be reached, but hard evidence
would be much better than speculation. In any event, Baird and Rasmussen do not
explain.
The normative issue raised by the End article is whether it is appropriate for
the DIP, through management, to be controlled by the “lenders.” The authors exhibit
the tendency found in much of the commercial-law literature to confuse “lenders”
with creditors, when the creditor body in fact consists of many classes of creditors,
often including classes of lenders conflicted inter se.249 By assuming some lender or
lenders represents all creditors, they can assume that control by lenders is the same
as control by creditors, which they applaud. In fact, control by a group of lenders is
highly unlikely to be neutral as among creditors—much less as among a broader
range of company constituencies250—and therefore it is unlikely to serve the
Congressional purposes, for the reasons explained in Part V. On the analysis
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presented here, a takeover of the Chapter 11 process by one group of creditors would
seem to be the occasion for concern, not celebration.251
Part VIII. Conclusion.
Although the literature in the field of commercial finance and financial
default has long been preoccupied with questions of priority, control is the central
concept in any persuasive model of the field. A lack of understanding of the role of
control explains the failure to recognize and analyze the crucial distinction between
an ordinary secured party and a dominant secured party and to see that the latter
offers a possible alternative to the bankruptcy trustee. The blurring of the types of
control generated by these two different types of security interest and confusion
between pre-default and post-default control has prevented development of the
important insights provided by Professors Scott and Mann with regard to control as a
central value-generating element in pricing secured transactions and measuring their
economic efficiency. A focus on control as the fundamental concept in the law of
default, linking secured credit law and bankruptcy law at their roots, will, among
other things, force recognition of priority issues as largely exogenous to bankruptcy
law, while neutrality issues rise to the top. Most immediately, as shown above, an
analysis based on control shows that a dominant security interest is the sine qua non
of contractualism. That structural relationship has been ignored by both
contractualists and their critics, but its exposure has serious consequences for the
contractualist enterprise.
With regard to bankruptcy reform, the analysis presented here suggests that
contractualism or some other entirely private ordering of the recovery process may
be a dead end, while the alleged trend to lender control of that process may require
new legislation to ensure neutrality. Those conclusions are supported by the fact that
there is considerable movement around the world in the general direction of United
States secured-credit law and bankruptcy law. As the Canadian and British
experiences demonstrate, however, other developed nations are experimenting with
significantly different versions that may well offer guidance to American
policymakers—but that is another article for another day.
Two forward-looking thoughts conclude the discussion. First, one motive for
the work leading to this article has been an attempt to understand the strange
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separation between secured credit law and theory and bankruptcy law and theory.
The decade-long debate over contractualism without a serious discussion of any
connection between it and secured credit is the defining example of that separation.
A second myopia, the absence of serious reference to the English system of secured
credit and receivership in the great debates over secured credit and over
contractualism, is another remarkable example of the effect of falsely dichotomous
thinking about secured credit and bankruptcy. As one result, important insights into
the issues of control before and after default have been left unconnected, like random
pages from the blueprints for an intricate machine.
The disregard of the obviously relevant English system of secured credit is
also a striking instance of the lack of comparative law study in this and many other
legal fields.252 If there are any useful thoughts in this article, they arise for the most
part from the perspectives provided by some years of comparative study of secured
credit and bankruptcy law. During the last decade many scholars from the United
States have traveled abroad and talked with foreign lawyers and scholars, yet the
influence of comparative study on American legal scholarship remains relatively
slight. It is wonderful that we can go elsewhere to teach, but it is even more
wonderful to learn. And we have much to learn.
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The void is not merely an absence of comparative articles and books, valuable as they are, but a
lack of study of other laws in relation to our own, a study that would greatly effect scholars’
understanding of our legal institutions.

